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Preface: Deconstructing Donation1
In the twenty first century, it seems that the body parts, tissue
and fluids that can be donated are limitless, and the purposes for donation have
extended beyond our imaginations. We can donate milk teeth, urine and tears
to art exhibitions such as Palaces or Museum of Water, which have prompted
researchers to consider the ethics of these donations as illustrated by the project
titled Trust me I’m an artist. When we look at how we make sense of ‘donation’
in the 21st century, we are right to question if the ideas, themes and approaches
from the past still apply to how donation is practiced today.
Donation and Altruism
As researchers in the field of donation, we have become en-
trenched in the same dialogue. The act of donation continues therefore to be
presented as one that is altruistic, and one that the public are struggling to
sustain – a topic that Emma King refers to in her article on cultured red blood
cells using stem cell technology for this special issue. This dominating influence
of the altruistic nature of donation is today reflected in the policy relating to
gamete donation for example, in that ‘payment’ to egg and sperm donors should
be classified as ‘reimbursement’ for the expenses incurred during the donation
i.e. travel or childcare costs. Whilst the difference in language might be small,
the implications for society can be deemed to be significant. Paying donors for
their donation would not only put a price on human body parts, but also in the
case of donating gametes, on the basis of ‘life’. Donors, in turn, would benefit
from their donation, and therefore no longer be altruistic in their act of donation.
Yet, the evolution of practices within clinics, such as egg-sharing between wo-
men with fertility problems in return for a reduction in the cost of fertility
treatment, illustrates the need for a critical approach to re-imagining donation
to generate alternative understandings of donation in the twenty first century.
Donation and a Right to Donate
Attention to some concepts, such as a right to donate, has
been reignited as new uses for previously ‘wasted’ blood have been generated.
Women who wish to store the cord blood as result of giving birth to their baby,
but are unable to afford the cost of commercial cord blood banks, view the option
to donate to the English public bank as an opportunity to also gain inexpensive
storage. So, if their baby or a family member requires the cord blood due to a
future illness, then the cord bloodmight be available for use, without incurring
the cost of commercial bank storage. In essence, the women perceive gains
resulting from their donation. However, donating to the public bank is restricted
according to the location of the collection sites in England. Therefore, for some
pregnant women who are unable to donate to the public bank due to not living
DOI 10.7590/221354015X144887672627501
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near a maternity ward that acts as a collection site, a right to donate emerges
in order to acquire the benefits they perceived arise from affordable storage.
Donation and Autonomy
Consent has been considered king when discussing the
donation of body parts, tissue and fluids, with the intention that they are given
freely and voluntarily – a topic Charlotte McLachlan and Gemma Potts apply
to their paper on prisoners donating their kidneys for this special issue. But
this perception of donation is challenged whenwe consider companion animals
as blood or organ donors or the introduction of the opt-out policy for organ
donation in Wales. No longer can the act of donation be simply considered as
one that is active, physical, or conscious. In cord blood donation, where the
blood is collected from the placenta that was attached to both the pregnant
woman and the foetus, there has been much debate as to whether it is the
mother or the baby that has donated. Similarly, in the case of deceased organ
donation, healthcare professionals rarely go ahead with a retrieval if the next
of kin have not consented to the donation, despite the deceased person being
on the organ donation register. It is not always clear then who is ‘doing’ the
donating – those consenting or those physically giving.
Hierarchies of Donors and their Donations
Policy and practices differ across the types of donation and
the purposes of donation. For example, donors are identifiable in some practices,
but not in others – a topic that Rebecca Dimond considers in her article on
mitochondrial donation for this special issue. The removal of gamete donor
anonymity in the UK means that donors are no longer in the shadows, but in-
stead can be identified and acknowledged for their role in the process – a topic
that Cathy Herbrand and Nicky Hudson discuss in their paper on information
sharing in donor conception in the UK and Belgium for this special issue.
However, the practice of identification of donors is not applied to the case for
blood or cord blood donation. Through these differences in policy and practices,
are we inadvertently privileging some body parts, fluids, tissue above others,
constructing a hierarchy of donations and donors? Do body parts used in art
exhibitions attach lessmeaning compared to those used in treatment, education,
or research? Or do we give meaning to body parts, tissue and blood previously
considered a ‘waste product’ or ‘replaceable’ through the act of donation, so that
the body part, tissue or fluid is perceived as life saving or advancing scientific
knowledge because of the purpose of donation. It is the same body part, tissue
or fluid donated, but for different purposes, and therefore generates different
meanings. Thereby prompting the questions what can we learn about the body
parts, tissue and fluids donated, and the relationships we have towards these
body parts, tissue, and fluid – a topic that Patricia Mahon-Daly explores in her
article on blood donation for this special issue? All donors and their donations
are therefore not equal.
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PREFACE: DECONSTRUCTING DONATION
Deconstructing Donation: Continuing the Discussion
The articles that follow in this special issue are the product of
the first Deconstructing Donation Conference held at Lancaster University in
December 2014. The conference included presentations from practitioner and
academic researchers in the field of donation, as well as initiating a week-long
writing competition for amateur authors, using a simple statement to create
an associated with donation ‘organs of donation’ (https://hourofwrites.com/
search?t=organ+donation). The conference, funded by Lancaster University
and the Institute of Medical Ethics, led to the British Sociological Association
Deconstructing Donation Study Group being established. The Group aims to
explore the understandings surrounding ‘donation’ today and ignite inter- and
multi- disciplinary dialogue between researchers and practitioners in the field
of donation. Since its inception, a range of activities have taken place, including
a Pecha Kucha session at the BSA Medical Sociological Annual Conference
(presentation recordings available on the BSA website), and the second Decon-
structing Donation Conference is planned to take place on 2016 (http://www.
britsoc.co.uk/groups/deconstructing-donation.aspx). The articles in this special
issue are a part of this continuing discussion of deconstructing donation today.
Dr Laura Machin & Miss Lisa Cherkassky
December 2015
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Biodiversity and perceptions of risk: Reactions to the use
of a single donor for stem-cell-derived red blood cell
transfusions
Dr Emma King*
NMAHP-RU, University of Stirling
Abstract
Blood transfusion is a well-accepted medical technology that cur-
rently relies on a supply of red blood cells from many thousands of altruistic donors.
Cultured red blood cells using stem cell technology could offer a replacement technology,
providing a limitless supply of red blood cells from a single source. This project used
interviews and focus groups to explore the views of a wide range of publics towards
cultured red blood cells. This paper explores how participants referred to a lack of
biodiversity in cultured red blood cells in three ways. The first was as a comparison
to GM crops, with concern over a monopoly on blood supplies. The second was a
perceived increased risk associated with a single source of blood. Thirdly participants
saw the lack of biodiversity as a threat to the altruistic nature of blood donation from
multiple donors.
Introduction
This paper is about a research project which looked at the
views of various publics towards the use of stem-cell-derived red blood cells for
transfusion. During the course of the research it was found that many partici-
pants compared this new technology with that of genetically modified (GM)
crops. In this paper I discuss how, in interviews and focus groups, GM crops
were used to describe a perceived lack of biodiversity. I introduce the transition
to cultured red blood cells as a continuation of historical aspects of blood
donation, to show the transition from donor gift to potential laboratory project.
I will also look at the attitudes towards GM crops in the UK, to discuss how a
perceived lack of biodiversity and the ‘scientification’ of nature are regarded as
inherently more risky.
DOI 10.7590/221354015X14488767262796*
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The historical context of donor blood transfusion
Although bloodletting was first recorded in 430BC and re-
mained a common practice until the nineteenth century,1 blood transfusion is
a relatively recent clinical practice. In 1628 Harvey’s2 book provided the know-
ledge needed for early animal transfusion experiments by Lower in 1665 and
Cox in 1666-67.3 The recognition of the need to transfuse humans only with
human blood 1818 was made by James Blundell, with blood types identified by
Karl Landsteiner in 1901.4 Routine blood typing was not practised until the
1920s, with the rhesus positive and negative blood types identified in 1941.5
Percy Oliver’s list of blood donors was started in 19216 but it was not until 1937
that Bernard Fantus set up the blood bank as we now know it, with blood re-
frigerated for up to ten days. Today blood is one of medicines’ ‘most vital com-
modities’7 and the UK alone transfuses 2.2 million units of blood each year.
Donation and transfusion is overseen by the NHS, with four transplant services
covering England and North Wales, South Wales, Northern Ireland, and Scot-
land. The Scottish National Blood Transfusion Service (SNBTS) is the main
focus of the research reported in this paper.
The need for a new method of transfusion
TheUKhas an established and effective blood donation system
but there are challenges which highlight the need for alternative methods of
blood transfusion. Preventing contamination of donated blood with transfusion
transmitted infections (TTIs) requires large amounts of blood testing, bringing
with it associated rises in cost.8 Acquiring adequate donors is another major
hurdle, with donor numbers falling and the UK transfusion services heading
towards a recruitment crisis. Currently only 4% of the UK population are re-
P. Giangrande, ‘The history of blood transfusion’, British Journal of Haematology 110:4 (200),
758-767.
1
W. Harvey, Exercitatio Anatomica de Motu Cordis et Sanguinis in Animalibus (1628).2
H. Brown, ‘Jean Denis and Transfusion of Blood, Paris, 1667-1668’, Isis 39:1/2 (1948), 15-29.3
K. Landsteiner, Ueber Agglutinationserscheinungen normalen menschlichen Blutes (1901).4
K. Landsteiner & A.S. Wiener, ‘Studies on an agglutinogen (rh) in human blood reacting with




D. Starr, Blood: an Epic History of Medicine and Commerce (Little, Brown and Company, 1999),
x.
7
E. Ferguson, C. Prowse, E. Townsend, A. Spence, J.A. van Hilten, & K. Lowe, ‘Acceptability of
blood and blood substitutes’, Journal of Internal Medicine 263:3 (2008), 244-255.
8
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gistered blood donors,9 and the Scottish National Blood Transfusion Service
expressed a need to raise the donor levels from 175,000 in 2008 to 210,000 in
2010.10 Many innovations have been proposed to overcome the dual challenges
of donor recruitment and possible infection risk. Haemoglobin-based oxygen
carriers (HBOCs),11 derived from human or animal blood and Perfluorocarbons
(PFCs),12 which are synthetic oxygen carriers, were heralded as an alternative
to red blood cell transfusion. Unfortunately neither product performed well in
clinical trials and are not licensed for use in the UK or USA.13, 14
This paper concerns the Novosang product, which is another proposed
technology to overcome both the requirement for donors and the infection risk.
Rather than using chemical substitutes for blood, the project goal is to culture
red blood cells in the laboratory, providing a limitless and infection free source
of blood for transfusion. To date the project has received over £ 12 million in
funding from organisations including theWellcome Trust, the Scottish Funding
Council, Scottish Enterprise, the Scottish National Blood Transfusion Service
and NHS Blood and Transplant.15 By the time the project finishes it is hoped
that it will generate small quantities of blood suitable for initial animal and
human safety tests.
The reaction of the wider public to this novel method of producing red blood
cells was unknown. Blood donations in the UK come from altruistic donors,
which has impacted on the interesting ‘gift relationship’ view of blood transfu-
sions, as was portrayed in Titmuss’16 book of the same name. Studies have
shown that donated blood is still preferable to other forms of blood replacement.
Ferguson et al.17 found that the public viewed blood substitutes as a ‘substandard
replacement’ for actual blood, an unnatural and synthetic alternative. A study
carried out by Fleming et al.18 found that those studied had a preference for
donor blood, being regarded as the most effective, most ethically acceptable
National Health Service, ‘Introduction to blood donation’, www.nhs.uk/conditions/Blood-
donation/Pages/Introduction.aspx (last accessed 18/03/2015).
9
National Health Service, Report: Meeting the transfusion needs of patients in Scotland. Scottish
National Blood Transfusion Service (2008).
10
T.A. Silverman & R.B. Weiskopf, ‘Haemoglobin-based Oxygen Carriers: Current Status and
Future Directions’, Anesthesiology 111:5 (2009), 946-963.
11
C.S. Cohn & M.M. Cushing, ‘Oxygen therapeutics: Perfluorocarbons and blood substitute
safety’, Critical Care Clinics 25:2 (2009).
12
T. Henkel-Honke &M. Oleck, ‘Artificial oxygen carriers: a current review’, Aana J. 75:3 (2007),
205-211.
13
S.J. Grethlein & A. Rajan, ‘Blood Substitutes’,Medscape Reference (2012).14
See more at www.novosang.co.uk.15
R.M. Titmuss, The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy (LSE Books, 1997).16
See footnote 8.17
P. Fleming, E. Ferguson, E. Townsend & K.C. Lowe, ‘Perceptions in transfusion medicine: a
pilot field study on risk and ethics for blood and blood substitutes’, Artificial Cells, Blood Substi-
tutes, And Immobilization Biotechnology 35:2 (2007), 149-156.
18
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and least ‘risky’. This was followed by chemical-based substitutes, bacteria-
grown substitutes and finally bovine-derived substitutes, which were seen as
being the most risky, least ethically acceptable and least effective. Notably, per-
ceptions of risk correlated with both ethicality and effectiveness for all of the
options. The Fleming study shows that human donor blood was still seen as
the preferred option by those who were interviewed. Other research on blood
and blood substitutes has identified a greater acceptability of blood substitutes
amongstmedical professionals, when compared to journalists or blood donors.19
There was also a marked difference between the risk levels perceived by these
groups concerning the infection rates through donation. However, none of
these papers looked at cultured red blood cells using stem cell technology, and
Ferguson et al. argued that a more effective ‘marketing’ of alternative blood
products may change the views that their respondents had expressed. Previous
developments in the blood products industry, such as the use of recombinant
DNA technology to provide Factor VIII, show that it is possible for an alternative
technology to become assimilated into mainstream practice.
This project set out to discover the reactions of various publics in Scotland
towards cultured red blood cells. In this paper I report specifically on the theme
of biodiversity as it was used by our participants in interviews and focus groups,
and particularly as it was used in comparison to GM crops. Given the focus of
this paper it is necessary to understand how such crops are viewed in the context
of the UK, where this research was conducted.
GM crops in the UK
GM crops in the UK (and in the rest of Europe) have not been
publicly accepted in the way that such crops have been in areas such as North
America and China.20 Since 2001 only one GM crop has been approved for
cultivation in Europe.21 Images of protesters in biohazard suits destroying fields
of GM crop tests were widely portrayed in the UKmedia during the late 1990s.
The website www.genewatch.co.uk states that currently no commercial GM
crops are grown in the UK although testing of such crops does continue. GM
products enter the UK from abroad in food, animal feed, and biofuels. At the
K.C. Lowe, K. Farrell, E.M. Ferguson & V. James, ‘Current perceived risks of transfusion in
the UK and relevance to the future acceptance of blood substitutes’, Artificial Cells, Blood Sub-
stitutes, And Immobilization Biotechnology 29:3 (2001), 179-189.
19
D. Burke, ‘GM food and crops: what went wrong in the UK? Many of the public's concerns
have little to do with science’, EMBO Reports 5:5 (2004), 432-436.
20
Y. Devos, O. Sanvido, J. Tait & A. Raybould, ‘Towards a more open debate about values in de-
cision-making on agricultural biotechnology’, Transgenic Res. 23:6 (2014), 933-943.
21
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time of writing this paper (August 2015) debates have once again resurfaced in
the media after Scotland declared a ban on the growing of GM crops.
Fears about GM crops in the UK have stemmed from a perception that
transgenes used in GM crops could transfer into other wild plants or non-GM
crop species.22 There has also been a backlash onmoral principles towards large
commercial companies having control over crop production. Terminator tech-
nology, which prevents farmers from storing seed for planting the following
year, means that growers must return to the GM company and rebuy seed each
year. Some consider this to be locking farmers into a continuing relationship
with the commercial company, whilst others see this as the only way to prevent
crops spreading in the wild and for companies to guarantee a return on their
investment. Some argue that basing a risk assessment of GM crops on public
attitudes has distanced the argument from scientific facts, pointing out that
many of these risk factors have been founded on human emotions and not on
scientific data.23
Methods
As part of our research into this new method of producing
blood, focus groups and interviews were carried out with a variety of publics.
The research methods used for this project will be described in more detail
elsewhere.
Four key groups were targeted:
– Patients who undergo regular blood transfusions, for example for sickle
cell disease or thalassaemia.
– Representatives of religious or moral groups who could contribute to the
discussion on cultured red blood cells from an ethical or religious stand-
point.
– Clinical groups, such as doctors and nurses, who use blood transfusions
in the course of their work.
– Community groups chosen to represent a spread of publics, who may not
have a background in science or medicine. These included sports clubs,
arts groups, etc.
Interviews were conducted with those who it were felt were ‘experts’ in their
field – which included doctors, ethicists, members of religious organisations,
A.F. Raybould & A.J. Gray, ‘Will hybrids of genetically modified crops invade natural commu-
nities?’, Trends in Ecology & Evolution 9:3 (1994), 85-89.
22
J. Tait, ‘Upstream engagement and the governance of science. The shadow of the genetically
modified crops experience in Europe’, EMBO Reports 10:S1 (2009).
23
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and patients. Focus groups were used to bring together those who might not
have previously considered the issues involved in cultured red blood cells, and
included community and sports groups, a college group, and residents in a
residential care home for the elderly. The majority of data collection took place
in Scotland, apart from a focus group with one patient group which took place
in London, and one expert interview in northern England. In total there were
27 data collection sessions, including interviews, full focus groups (approx. two
hours) and mini focus groups (which ran from a few minutes to one hour and
were often unrecorded). The interviews and focus groups which had been voice
recorded were transcribed verbatim and then the transcripts and notes from
unrecorded sessions were coded using NVivo software. A grounded theory
methodology24was used, to draw information from the data rather than starting
with preconceived theories. In total 22 nodes were used, of which one of these
described the views of the interviewees towards the ‘biodiversity’ of the cultured
blood product.
Results
The theme of biodiversity was discussed by our respondents
in a number of ways. These included feelings of ‘everything being the same’,
and of cultured blood production being like ‘GM crops’. These conversations
around biodiversity are divided into three interlocking themes of commercial-
isation, risk associated with a lack of biodiversity, and social considerations.
Theme 1: Commercialisation
The first theme saw participants compare cultured red blood cells to the
perceived commercialisation of GM crops. Participants reflected on the way
that a ‘free’ product was being turned into a profit making facility – both in the
commercialisation of crops which would grow naturally and in the commercial-
isation of blood which is currently obtained from altruistic donors. This of
course glosses over many of the current production costs necessary in both
farming and blood transfusion. With increased commercialisation came an
appreciation of the rising power wielded by those in control of the product.
‘And my sinister side would say, is there any way that a large corporation could
say “and you now need to come back to us” and there would be some kind of power
base. Like the genetically modified crop companies in the US who have made it so
that any farmer now wanting to farm for the major supermarket chains will then
A.L. Strauss & J. Corbin, ‘Grounded Theory Methodology’, in: N.K. Denzin & Y.S. Lincoln
(eds.),Handbook of Qualitative Research (Sage, 1994).
24
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harvest the grain and will need to go back to the GM company because it only has a
rate of regeneration for one year only. And you are then going cap in hand again to
buy more seed. And they have deliberately done that in their economic engine of “and
you will need us”.’ (Interview)
Participants raised concerns that the use of blood would be restricted to
those who could afford to pay for it, and that the supply of blood might be tied
to a particular commercial company who had control over the use of blood by
health-care systems. There was also a feeling of unease that commercial com-
panies were profit driven andmore likely to cut corners in the pursuit of profits
over consumer safety. In contrast there was high trust in public bodies such as
the blood transfusion services and the NHS.
However this discussion on commercialisation was tempered in part by a
realisation that commercial companies are necessary in the development of
healthcare technologies, and that we already rely heavily on such companies to
innovate new pharmaceutical products and devices.
‘Pretty much all the drugs that have been developed have been developed by industry
for commercial gain but it benefited everyone hugely and probably half of these drugs
wouldn’t be here if it wasn’t for the commercial drive to do it. It’s all very well saying
it’s for public good and it should be for everyone but that’s not how things get developed,
or very expensive things get developed. It seems that the blood thing is coming from
this position that we’re in now where there’s this ethos of giving and it’s available to
everyone and it’s not for profit. There’s a sort of a tension.’ (Focus group)
‘Can I suggest, we’re talking from a slightly naïve point. We in the UK have this
perception of everything being free on the NHS, albeit we’re paying for it through
other methods, this is not something that is going to be exclusively done in the UK,
this is going to be taken up in America or wherever else, either now or at some point
in the future. So whether it’s developed in the UK and then licensed out or whether
America says we can do this as well. Who’s going to pay for that? Is it going to be
private companies who see the long-term game plan that would make billions out of
it, and without that private money going in, is it ever actually to get to the point of
making it to production? I’ve no idea how much the Wellcome Trust has, and if
they’re the only body who are involved in this, but sooner or later surely they’re going
to say, wait a minute we’ve spent it all, and this is going to run for 20 years until it
comes to production.’ (Focus group)
There was a lack of awareness amongst many of the participants about the
true cost of many healthcare practices in the UK, including blood donation,
which the participant is referring to here, and which will be discussed further
below.
157Journal of Medical Law and Ethics 2015-3
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Theme 2: Lack of biodiversity as increased risk
People also compared cultured blood to GM crops as a view that a lack of
biodiversity was somehow riskier. In some unrecorded mini-focus groups the
participants referred to the problems of having all the eggs in one basket (what
would happen if something went wrong), or of a general (but unspecified) un-
ease about ‘everything being the same’.
‘I meant in terms of the practicalities, would it not be better to have a cocktail of
individuals come together for the red blood cells, for your stock? But I don’t know
whether that is a technical issue. Just thinking from a general biological perspective,
having your feedstock based on a single individual can run into problems, and often
unexpected problems. Although I appreciate that with red blood cells you’ve not got
the genetic issue. I don’t know enough about the technicalities but just from a general
biological perspective I don’t know how wise it would be to base it all on a single indi-
vidual, but I’m sure your guys know what they’re doing.’ (Interview)
Despite the fact that there might not be a biological basis for a lack of bio-
diversity to result in increased risk, it was recognised as a legitimate risk factor
that many people might identify. This interviewee believed that this stemmed
from the fear of the unknown about cultured blood products, although in this
case it was compared to irradiated foods rather than GM crops.
‘That sense of perception that “I don’t know how all this stuff works, but natural
to have reactions like thinking this may be passed on”. Similar to the reactions to ir-
radiated food etc. In terms of scientific rationale it is completely wrong, but it terms
of how people frame issues then that is the way that they think.’ (Interview)
Again this was balanced by the view that a lot of the reactions we have to
GM crops have been picked up frommedia stories, and do not necessarily reflect
reality.
‘You’d think some of the reception in the greater world out there would depend
on how the media present this, in focus groups like this we can talk calmly and ratio-
nally about it but how would the media present it to the greater population? We’ve
seen the GM foods, Frankenfoods and all this kind of thing, how would that be
presented? That would be a concern as to how the scientific world presented it via the
media, what the media actually took.’ (Focus group)
Theme 3: Cultured blood in a social context
The final theme was that of biodiversity affecting how we view cultured
blood in a social context. Currently blood in the UK is given bymany thousands
of anonymous donors and has a strong sense of ‘gift giving’. However as partic-
ipants raised, this may change if all the blood being produced is coming from
one or a small number of stem cell lines.
Journal of Medical Law and Ethics 2015-3158
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‘But if things, if everything can be bought or sold, if the concept of gift is no longer
something that is valued in society, people in America sell their blood, apparently all
along the border withMexico there’s a whole lot of blood clinics because they’re getting
the blood from the poorMexicans. If this concept of solidarity, a gift is no longer valued
or even made possible then I think society as a whole will be weakened.’ (Interview)
In this quote the interviewee appears to be relating a change in the social
context of blood donation to the increased commercialisation and profit making
around blood. Whereas in the quote below the participants are reflecting on
the perceived lack of biodiversity, with all the blood coming from a single source
rather than the many altruistic donors.
‘F1: I guess there’s also the point that there might be six or ten nationwide sources
of this blood, six or ten people walking around in the UK whose blood is now in the
veins of a million people, and that’s not how it is at the moment [?] people, whether
that would bother people.
F2: I suppose it’s removing diversity, isn’t it …
F1: People would have a problem with that, the way that people have problems
with perceiving organs more than they do giving blood for some reason carrying part
of that person around with them, does it make a difference if everyone is carrying a
part of the same person?’ (Focus group)
Although red blood cells only last around 120 days in the body there is still
a perception that one is receiving part of another person, although, as is high-
lighted in the quote, perhaps less than through an organ transplant.
Discussion
Focus group and interview participants discussed biodiversity
in the context of cultured blood in three ways. The first was a comparison of
cultured blood to GM crops, the second was a perceived increased risk in cul-
tured blood, and the third theme was a supposed social difference between
cultured and donated blood.
In the first theme participants compared cultured blood to GM crops as a
commercialisation of something which is regarded as intrinsically ‘free’. It was
argued that this commercialisationmight lead to restrictions on access to blood.
A socioeconomic concern about GM crops has been the terminator technology
put in place by some GM crop companies, which renders GM seeds sterile. If
farmers wish to continue with the GM crops they must return to the company
each year to buy seeds, which some see as creating a monopoly by the GM seed
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companies.25 Similarly participants highlighted the potential risk of a cultured
blood company putting a high price on blood which wouldmake it unaffordable
for the NHS or for individuals. In comparing cultured blood to GM crops our
participants were reacting to what they saw as the restriction of something
natural and ‘free’, a monopoly on something which is currently given as an al-
truistic gift.26
Such discussions speak to a wider question of commercialisation vs. open
source science.27 On one hand technologies such as GM crops, or cultured
blood, are seen to commercialise something which is regarded as naturally
available. On the other hand a lack of monetary incentive could dissuade com-
mercial involvement in future research.28 In the UK the true cost of blood pro-
duction remains relatively hidden within the ‘black-box’ of the NHS. But the
large amounts of processing and testing carried out means that blood is essen-
tially already a commercialised product, with a biovalue that is becoming in-
creasingly recognised.29, 30 Indeed some participants attempted to raise the issue
that we rely on commercialisation all the time for pharmaceutical developments,
but that we simply are not aware of this because everything is done through
the umbrella of the NHS. They were also aware that the NHS is unlikely to
produce all the blood necessary for the entire world, meaning that other coun-
tries may be able to set prices for cultured blood which are outside the control
of the UK developers.
Cultured red blood cells were perceived by participants to bemore risky due
to their perceived lack of biodiversity, compared to the current donation system
which acquires blood from many individual donors. Increased risk was seen
due to the possibility that, with a single stem cell line, if problems were found
in this blood then thousands of people would be affected. Participants felt that
to produce only one blood source was akin to ‘putting all the eggs in one basket’,
with no knowledge of whatmight happen in years to come or whether that stem
cell line would turn out to have some vital flaw. Conversely one of the aims of
cultured red blood cells is to reduce the risk disease transmission due to the
current method of obtaining blood from many different donors. The transfer
of hepatitis from donor to recipient was an ongoing problem for many years,
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howevermorewidely publicisedwas theHIV contamination of plasma products,
which was first recognised in the early 1980s and affected many haemophi-
liacs.31, 32 The authorities were slow to inform patients or withdraw infected
batches, which Starr33 attributes to the reverence given to blood and its symbolic
nature as a social gift, rather than a pharmaceutical product. Previous work,
however, has shown that despite infection risks donated human blood is still
preferred over any other source,34, 35 including bovine derived, and synthetic
blood. This work, however, did not take into account the prospect of stem cell
derived blood, which is still human blood, just produced in a laboratory.
Finally the participants discussed biodiversity as it affects the social element
of blood donation. This theme was heavily intertwined with the perception of
risk from a lack of biodiversity, but focused more on the social connections
between blood donors and recipients. Red blood cells have no nucleus or nuclear
DNA, yet one group specifically said that this did not change theirminds because
there could be ‘something else’ (which was undefined) which meant that the
blood given by each different individual was unique to them. There was inherent
unease about all the blood in theUK potentially coming from a single individual
(even if that ‘individual’ is a stem cell line). For so many years the public in the
UK have been used to blood coming from multiple donors, an act of altruism
which has led to themany comparisons between blood donation and gift giving.
There is still a view that some of the individual is transferred in some way
through donation, be that a donation of blood or organs.36With blood donation
in the UK currently using altruistic donors there is an element of ‘not knowing’
where this blood comes from and who the original donor is. In contrast this
cultured blood is a known entity, as every recipient will be getting red blood
cells grown from a single (or a small number) of donor lines.
Blood appears to fit a special criteria, especially in the UK, given the attach-
ment to the transfusion services and the gift relationship around blood. Many
participants seemed unable to articulate exactly what is was about the lack of
diversity in red blood cells that they disliked, almost in themanner of the ‘yuck’
factor.37 Participants also did not compare the blood to any other technologies,
although this may have been for two reasons, one that they were not prompted
D. Starr, Blood: an Epic History of Medicine and Commerce (Little, Brown and Company, 1999),
262.
31
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down this route by the focus group/interview facilitator, and the other that we
tend to compare new technologies with those we are used to or estimate risks
based on those technologies which are more prevalent in the media.38 It is
perhaps unsurprising that participants were not so well acquainted with other
comparable technologies such as synthesised insulin or Factor VIII, but were
more aware of higher profile technologies such as blood transfusion and GM
crops. This would be a limitation of this study, as it is with all qualitative studies,
that the influence of the questions asked and the particular setting of the group
or interview can have such a strong influence on the outcomes. However, given
that so many of the groups and interviews brought up the issue of GM crops
without prompting gives some weight to the idea that this topic was foremost
in participants’ minds as a comparator technology.
Younger respondents did not appear to have such an attachment to the
donation system as the older ones did, and therefore saw the cultured red blood
cells as clean, more sci-fi and scientific. This seems to be linked to the general
lack of contact with the blood transfusion services compared to older participants,
many of whom had either received a transfusion or had been donors for many
years. Indeed this comparesmore with the reaction of the scientists themselves,
who see less risk in the standardisation of blood, as it will come from a single
‘known’ source rather thanmany ‘unknown’ donors.With risk perception based
on the perceived ‘trustworthiness’ of companies39 it will be interesting to see
how this affects the risk perception of cultured blood, given that both this and
donated blood are associated with the SNBTS. One possibility is that perceptions
about the role of the blood transfusion services change as cultured blood be-
comes more prominent. Division in attitudes between younger and older
audiences is therefore an area which would benefit from further study. Carrying
out this research in the UK has highlighted issues that may have not been ex-
pressed elsewhere, because the expectation in the UK is that everybody, regard-
less of their income, receives all the health care that they require for no cost.
This has the additional result of making healthcare in the UK a black-box, with
many of us having no idea of the true cost of pharmaceuticals or medical pro-
cedures. It is worth noting that if this data had been collected in the US, for
example, then reactions to this issue of commercialisation may have been very
different. This comparison with other countries is an important area for further
study.
B. Fischhoff, A. Bostrom & M.J. Quadrel, ‘Risk perception and communication’, Annu. Rev.
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Conclusion
In conclusion, the data show that participants compared cul-
tured red blood cells with GM crops and saw a lack of biodiversity as inherently
risky and a threat to the established social ties of donated blood. The commer-
cialisation of a natural product led to concerns about the monopoly of blood,
leaving it only available to those with the ability to afford it. Cultured blood was
seen asmore risky if all the blood came from one stem cell line, despite ongoing
problems with infection risks linked to the large number of altruistic donors
currently involved in the supply of red blood cells for transfusion. Finally the
altruistic and gift-like nature of blood was seen as being replaced by the homog-
enous donor blood, and in doing so some of the social interaction of blood
transfusion was being removed. Although only a small number of our partici-
pants were young adults (18-25 years) they appeared to have a weaker attachment
to the transfusion services and viewed the cultured blood as cleaner and more
scientific. This was therefore a suggestion for further work, alongside a compar-
ison of the attitudes to cultured blood in countries which do not operate under
a system of national health provision.
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Techniques of donation: ‘three parents’, anonymity and
disclosure
Dr Rebecca Dimond*
Cardiff University School of Social Sciences
Abstract
The clinical application of novel in-vitro fertilisation techniques
involving mitochondrial donation was legalised in the UK in 2015. Mitochondria
contain genetic material and it is possibly not surprising that headlines have described
the resulting baby as having ‘three parents’ – the intending mother and father, and
the egg donor. The techniques raise important questions, including how do we interpret
transfer of biological material from one body to another? What are the implications
for identity? And how, whether or when should the use of these techniques be revealed
to the child? This article has two aims. First, it sets out the key ethical issues raised
by the clinical introduction of mitochondrial donation. Secondly, it presents empirical
data to highlight how patients themselves respond to these ethical questions. It con-
cludes by highlighting how the introduction of medical technologies and the relation-
ships between donors and recipients are dependent on the cultural, historical and social
contexts.
Introduction
In March 2015, UK Parliament voted to change the law to
support the clinical application of novel in-vitro fertilisation (IVF) procedures
which involve the transfer of nuclear material into an enucleated donated egg.
These techniques are widely known as mitochondrial donation. The result is
that the UK is at the cutting edge of mitochondrial science and the only country
in the world to legalise germ-line technologies. Scientific, medical and patient
communities across the world have closely followed the developments with
interest. In September 2015, theHuman Fertilisation and Embryology Authority
(HFEA) announced their plans for how centres will be licensed andwhat expec-
tations will be placed on those centres to engage in monitoring babies born
using the technique. It is expected that the first cohort of ‘three parent’ babies
will be born in the UK in 2016, and as was the case following the birth of the
first IVF baby, Louise Brown, in 1978 and again when she gave birth to her first
child at the age of 28, it might be expected that the health and development of
these children, and potentially their future childrenwill be watchedwith interest.
DOI 10.7590/221354015X14488767262831*
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The techniques have attracted intense scientific, media and public interest,
with spectres of 'three parent babies’, ‘slippery slopes’ and Frankenstein science
competing for headline space alongside stories of womenwho have experienced
the pain of losing a child to mitochondrial disease. Behind the alarming head-
lines, techniques ofmitochondrial donation raise important questions for society.
These include how we should understand the transfer of genetic material from
one body to another, how this might impact on the child’s identity and how,
whether or when children should be told about this intervention. This article
aims to do two things. First, it aims to set out the key ethical issues raised by
the development and clinical introduction ofmitochondrial donation. Secondly,
based on research exploring the patient experience of mitochondrial disease, it
presents empirical data to highlight how patients themselves respond to these
ethical questions. Although much has been speculated about the widespread
support of these techniques by patients and patient groups, and the importance
of listening to those views, this is the first article to present the views of patients
in the context of recent legislation. The techniques and the political process
have raised many complex issues. This article focuses on three issues: ‘three
parent babies’, anonymity and disclosure. These topics not only illuminate some
of the key aspects of the mitochondria debate but also have resonance for ex-
ploring the social and ethical aspects of many other techniques involving
donation.
Research Methods
This article draws on the analysis of 21 semi-structured inter-
views conducted with patients diagnosed with maternally inherited mitochon-
drial disease. The aim of this project was twofold: to explore the patient experi-
ence of mitochondrial disease and to understand patients’ perspectives on mi-
tochondrial donation. Ethical approval was gained through theNorth ScotlandRe-
search Ethics Committee and participants were contacted through a national
mitochondria research clinic. All names have been changed to ensure anonymity.
The interviews lasted between one and two hours, and a loosely structured in-
terview schedule was followed. The topics discussed included the experience
of diagnosis, health management, communication strategies within the family
and the role of reproductive technologies. Based on the author’s previous expe-
rience of interviewing patients with mitochondrial disease and the difficulties
of talking about controversial technologies, small cards were produced with
statements printed on them, which were then used to prompt discussion. These
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cards were initially prepared as part of Q methodology,1 an established method
within psychology which has now been developed to explore public understand-
ing of science, health behaviours and technologies.2 This article also draws on
publicly accessible reports prepared by the Department of Health, HFEA and
Nuffield Council on Bioethics.
What is mitochondria and mitochondrial disease?
Mitochondria are small structures in the cytoplasm of a cell.
The 37 genes contained in mitochondrial DNA are primarily responsible for
producing the cell’s energy, and make up less than 0.1% of our body’s total
DNA. Mitochondrial disease is caused when the mitochondria fail to function,
the results of which can be extremely variable in terms of symptoms and severity.
Symptoms can include diabetes, deafness, epilepsy, digestive disorders and
extreme fatigue, and for many patients, the disease is progressive. The term
‘mitochondrial disease’ encompasses a range of disorders, includingmitochon-
drial encephalomyopathy, lactic acidosis and stroke-like episodes (MELAS)
Leber’s hereditary optic neuropathy (LHON) and Leigh syndrome.
Asmitochondria are derived through the oocyte, disease caused bymutations
of mitochondrial DNA are only inherited through the female line. This means
that while both sexes can inherit the disease it is only women who are at risk
of transmitting the disease to their children. There is no cure for mitochondrial
disease and the treatment options, which formost people will be strong vitamins,
has limited results. In this context, the development of techniques which can
prevent a child from inheriting the disease have been widely welcomed. Scien-
tists at the Wellcome Trust Centre for Mitochondrial Research in Newcastle
have developed two related techniques which involve the ‘donation’ of healthy
mitochondria within an IVF cycle. Maternal spindle transfer involves removing
the nucleus of the egg and placing it into a donated, enucleated egg. Pro-nuclear
transfer involves a similar process but occurs after fertilisation. Both techniques
are reported to offer women with mitochondrial disease the only opportunity
for having healthy, genetically related children.
As the donor’s mitochondria could be inherited by future generations, the
techniques are germ-line, and a change in UK law was required for them to be
offered to patients. The transition from laboratory to clinic has involved intense
S. Watts & P. Stenner,Doing QMethodological Research: Theory, Method and Interpretation (Lon-
don: Sage 2012).
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and extensive enquiry and debate, reflecting its controversial nature, and national
and international significance. The process involved three scientific reviews by
an expert panel,3 a dialogue exercise to assess public attitudes4, a call for evidence
on the ethical issues organised by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics5, a public
consultation6 and government guidance on draft regulations led by the UK
Department of Health,7 and several debates at the House of Commons8 and
House of Lords.9
‘Three parent babies’
Asmitochondria contain genetic material, it is not surprising
that ideas about what this might mean for genetic identity and parentage have
captured the imagination, been used in alarmist headlines, and come under
scrutiny. ‘Three parent babies’ headlines have primarily dominated the debate,10
alongside more subtle ideas of ‘three person IVF’, ‘three person babies’ and
‘three person DNA’.11 Based on the extent of the genetic contribution and the
function of the genes involved, the Department of Health does not accept that
a child born through mitochondrial donation would have three parents:
HFEA, Third scientific review of the safety and efficacy of methods to avoid mitochondrial disease
through assisted conception: update 2014, www.hfea.gov.uk/8807.html (last accessed 22/9/2015).
3
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uk/docs/HFEA_Authority_meeting_March_2013_-_Mitchondria_report.pdf (last accessed
22/9/2015).
Nuffield Council on Bioethics,Novel techniques for the prevention of mitochondrial DNA disorders:
an ethical Review (London: Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2012), www.nuffieldbioethics.org/
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mitochondrial-dna-disorders (last accessed 22/9/2015).
Department of Health,Mitochondrial Donation: A consultation on draft regulations to permit the
use of new treatment techniques to prevent the transmission of a serious mitochondrial disease from
mother to child (2014), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
6
data/file/285251/mitochondrial_donation_consultation_document_24_02_14_Access-
ible_V0.4.pdf (last accessed 22/9/2015).
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‘Genetically, the child will, indeed, have DNA from three individuals but all
available scientific evidence indicates that the genes contributing to personal
characteristics and traits come solely from the nuclear DNA, which will only
come from the proposed child’s mother and father. The donatedmitochondrial
DNA will not affect those characteristics.’12
Many of the participants interviewed for this project were aware of the
complexity of the debate and its competing ideas, including the biological sig-
nificance of genetic material and the role of genetics in influencing our identity.
Many highlighted the small contribution of mitochondrial genes that might
render it insignificant in transfer, and that overall, themetaphor of ‘three parent
babies’ was not useful:
‘[People oppose the techniques] thought there’d be three parents involved
and it would pose problems with visiting rights and things, which it wouldn’t
be anything like that. And I did get annoyed and, and like some of the govern-
ment parliament people were standing up and arguing their point against it. I
thought, well if they had a daughter that was suffering and having problems
you wouldn’t be so [opposed] […] they’re taking a gene from another lady but
as regards to her being a parent, no. It’s just like, giving your heart or your lung
to somebody isn’t it? You don’t own them.’ [Participant 19]
‘The dodgy gene is extracted from the mother who wants a child, isn’t it,
her egg? And the healthy gene is put into her egg. So the gene is a just a tiny,
tiny part of it. An egg is part of you, part of your – Well, it’s you. Your hair col-
ouring, your personality, everything. [The donor] has contributed and they’ve
supported and helped somebody, but no, I don't think it’s a three-parent [...]
But just to take a gene, a healthy gene and take away the bad gene, you're doing
it for health reasons. You’re not creating somebody else’s child. Do you know
what I mean? I don’t think they can put a claim to it.’ [Participant 24]
In some cases, the words of the participants concur with the Department
of Health’s advice as described previously. Following this advice, the UK gov-
ernment has set an important precedent: the relationship between child and
donor has been characterised as one where there is no parental obligation on
behalf of the donor.13 This means that while donors will be able to find out
Department of Health,Mitochondrial Donation: Government response to the consultation on draft
regulations to permit the use of new treatment techniques to prevent the transmission of a serious
mitochondrial disease from mother to child (2014) 15, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
12
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/332881/Consultation_response.pdf (last accessed 22/9/
2015).
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Mitochondrial Donation) Regulations 201513
(SI 2015/572), www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2015/572/contents/made?page=5 (last accessed
22/9/2015).
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whether a child has been born using their donation, children will only be able
to access non-identifying information about the donor.
Donor Anonymity
The system of anonymity that will be introduced alongside
mitochondrial donation techniques will have important implications for the
child and their family. Many of the participants held the view that the donor
should remain anonymous:
‘They [the mitochondria donors] have decided that they will donate to help
you have a healthy child, so therefore to me, that’s where the ethics stop. They
don’t have any rights to sort of have contact with the child. They’ve decided they
want to be a donor, hopefully for the right reasons, not that they then want to
have claims on the child that you’re having.’ [Participant 3]
‘It’s like when you give blood; you don’t know where it’s going, but it’s
probably saving somebody’s life. But you don't get to know those people. So,
at the end of the day, if you give genes or cells or whatever it is, bone marrow,
anything, you know somewhere along the line you’ve done somebody some
good, but you don’t know who you’ve done it for. But it’s just something that
you feel is right.’ [Participant 25]
Once again, the words of the participants echo the views of the Department
of Health andUK government. However, included in the legislation is provision
that might open up the opportunity for children and their unknown donors to
make contact. Along with their health records, the donor can provide non-
identifying information about themselves for the child if they wish, and the
clinic can support a voluntary system of contact between the donor and child.
Disclosure
One key recommendation from the Department of Health,
and one that relates to the uncertainty about the safety of the techniques, was
that the health of any child born through mitochondrial donation should be
monitored. Engaging children in follow up naturally raises ethical concerns
about the genetic testing of children,14 and their potential to be medicalised
A.L. Bredenoord & P. Braude, ‘Ethics of mitochondrial gene replacement: from bench to bed-
side’, British Medical Journal (2010) 341.
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from a very early age. It is also possible, provided that there is funding in place
and the participants are willing, that this follow up will extend to future gener-
ations. However, one of the key assumptions on which ‘follow up’ is based is
that families will agree to sustained contact with the clinic. However, another
fundamental issue, whichmight be influential in whether or not families engage
in medical services, hinges on disclosure. The participants in this study had
differing views about whether the child should be told:
‘But I think in a way it would be cruel for the children to be told. Because
it confuses things when there’s no need for confusion. Because I think the
mitochondrial donation should be regarded like any other sort of medical pro-
cedure. Because it’s not the same as sperm donation where clearly half of the
genetic material comes from a parent. I think the percentage is so small that
you shouldn’t – I think things should be anonymised.’ [Participant 8]
‘I think they should have a right to know, but I think that it should be ex-
plained first, exactly what has been used and the mind and everything else
hasn’t changed. The only thing that’s changed is they’ve got a healthier life,
and that is thanks to the person that donated. But apart from thanking them
for giving them a better life, they’re not related, it’s just like having a heart by-
pass. Someone’s put something into you that makes you function okay.’ [Par-
ticipant 5]
‘I think the child and the parent might want to have contact later on. Again,
something you might do if you have an adopted child, the child’s choice but
not until a lot later until they’re able tomake that choice. I don’t think you could
say no to them, they’re going to have ways of researching and looking.’ [Partic-
ipant 17]
One of the enduring factors about family life is that many children born
through assisted reproduction and those who are adopted might not be told of
the origins of their birth.15 Thus even after changes to the anonymity laws in
the case of adoption or sperm donation, accessing information about genetic
inheritance relies very much on open disclosure practices of families. With the
only recent legalisation of the techniques, combined with very little published
evidence exploring the patient experience of mitochondrial disease,16 whether
families disclose this information to their child following use of mitochondrial
M. Richards, ‘A British history of collaborative reproduction and the rise of the genetic connec-
tion’, in: T. Freeman, S. Graham, F. Ebtehaj & M. Richards (eds.), Relatedness in Assisted Repro-
duction (Cambridge University Press 2014).
15
R. Dimond, ‘Patient and family trajectories ofmitochondrial disease: diversity, uncertainty and
genetic risk’, Life Sciences, Society and Policy 9 (2013) 1-11.
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donation is currently an unknown. This study goes some way to contribute to
knowledge about how families might manage these processes following use of
themitochondrial techniques, and why some families, despite appearing enthu-
siastic at first, might in fact lose contact with the ‘follow up’ clinic.
Discussion
One of the defining characteristics of technologies involving
donation is that they have the potential to produce new social relationships.
Whereas blood donation might be described as an altruistic and anonymous
‘gift’,17 the relationship between a recipient and an organ or tissue donor will
depend on many factors including whether or not the donation is from a living
donor and whether the donor and recipient are already known to each other.
Reproductive technologies are different again, where the relationship between
a sperm or egg donor and resultant child is often more clearly defined within
a legal framework. Mitochondrial donation, which involves the transfer of ge-
netic but not nuclear material transgresses these boundaries and has led to
uncertainty about how the technologies themselves, and the potential relation-
ship between donor and child, should be regulated. The possibility of forging
a relationship between donor and recipient, and the meanings that we give to
these relationships are of course highly dependent on the kinds of technologies
involved and the legal, social and cultural context. The recent legislation, con-
cluding that the mitochondrial donation should not have an obligation towards
the child, is important for how families themselves might make sense of these
technologies.
The accounts of the participants provide further evidence of the complexity
of these decisions. In deciding the role of the mitochondria donor, or whether
the child should know about the techniques, participantsmoved easily between
recognising the importance of genetic knowledge and perceivingmitochondrial
DNA to have a relatively insignificant role. Importantly, participants made a
distinction between donation for reproductive purposes and donation for health
or avoiding illness. This distinction also became important when assessing the
potential role of the mitochondria donor. Being a donor ‘for the right reasons’,
that is, to improve health, led to the conclusion that the person should not then
be allowed to claim a relationship with the child as theymight in cases of sperm
donation or adoption.
Participant accounts highlight how the meanings we attribute to the tech-
niques of mitochondrial donation, mitochondrial DNA and the mitochondria
R. Titmuss, The gift relationship: From human blood to social policy (A. Oakley & J. Ashton eds.,
London: LSE 1997 [1971]).
17
Journal of Medical Law and Ethics 2015-3172
DIMOND
donor are developed within a particular context. By frequently comparingmito-
chondrial donation with other kinds of donation, including heart donation,
kidney donation, blood donation and sperm donation, participants revealed the
cultural, historical and social backdrop in which relations between donors and
recipients are played out. Mitochondrial donation is made sense of because it
is categorised as similar, or different, to other kinds of techniques. Mitochon-
drial donation will allow women with mitochondrial disease the opportunity to
have healthy, genetically related children. It is part of a rapidly developing field
of mitochondrial medicine, involving the development of diagnostic technolo-
gies, risk assessment tools and IVF technologies. However, the techniques have
challenged legal and ethical frameworks, and the translation from laboratory
to clinical practice has involved a long period of scrutiny. The techniques have
attracted intense media interest, and strong views have been expressed by na-
tional and international patient and scientific groups. This article has highlighted
the views of patients with mitochondrial disease, and this is an important con-
tribution. Although attitudes often differ about the central importance of mito-
chondrial DNA, this article has shown that patient perspectives, and the debate
itself, cannot be reduced to genetic essentialist reasoning. One aspect that ap-
peared prominent in discussions with patients was the perceived motivations
of donors and parents. The focus on health rather than reproduction is possibly
one of the reasons why the techniques have attracted widespread support. In-
deed, although the techniques might have wider benefit than those with mito-
chondrial disease, other potential uses have been ruled out, including for fertility
purposes18 and for lesbian couples who wish to use the techniques so that both
parties can provide a genetic contribution. Of course questions remain about
what will happen in practice, and many countries across the world will be
watching and waiting with interest as to how children, parents, families, donors
and UK institutions negotiate these contentious issues.
C. Smyth, ‘Allow three-parent IVF to help older women too, says pioneer’, The Times (9 February
2015), www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/health/news/article4348194.ece (last accessed 22/9/2015).
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Abstract
Within the context of donor conception, the significance of knowing
about one’s genetic origins and the moral and legal status of this information has
been the subject of on-going and vociferous debate in a number of Western countries.
Ten years on from the removal of donor anonymity in the UK, this paper considers
the significance of donor identification law and its relationship to social practices in
the UK and Belgium. Despite a similar liberal attitude towards medically assisted
reproduction, the UK and Belgium have adopted significantly divergent measures on
the issue of donor anonymity. In this paper we describe these regulatory differences
and consider the perceptions and experiences of donor identification in each country
by contrasting the findings of studies relating to donor conception. We conclude by
arguing that greater attention should be given to the complex interplay between legal
frameworks and social practices relating to gamete donation and highlight the need
for more detailed future research to inform policy-making in assisted reproduction.
Introduction1
Within the context of donor conception,2 the significance of
knowing about one’s genetic origins and the moral and legal status of this in-
formation has been the subject of on-going and vociferous debate in a number
of Western countries. For a number of reasons, the importance granted to
having information regarding identity, family history, and susceptibility to
certain illnesses has burgeoned in recent years, with the associated implication
that the anonymity of donors and the issue of access to information about
donors has been a major ethical, political and legal challenge. Arguments for
DOI 10.7590/221354015X14488767262877*
We would like to thank Prof. Guido Pennings and Dr Lucy Frith for their insightful comments
on an earlier draft of this paper.
1
A means of achieving pregnancy via the use of a third party donor who provides eggs, sperm
or embryos for use by intended parents but who has no legal parental responsibility for the
resulting offspring.
2
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a move towards more ‘openness’ in donation systems have also led on occasion
to legislative changes, with a number of nations deciding to remove or ban an-
onymity in favour of identity-release systems3 or those within which both an-
onymous and non-anonymous donations are possible.4
Debate and commentary on this issue in a range of social contexts have
tended to conflate a legal position of anonymity for gamete donors with a wider
cultural practice of non-disclosure or ‘secrecy’ within families and, correspond-
ingly, have conflated a legal position of identification with a culture of disclosure
between parents and donor offspring. As well as creating possible terminological
confusion, the suggested alignment of social practices with the law obscures
the complexity and diversity of attitudes regarding the possible disclosure of
the use of donor conception within families and communities. Ten years on
from the removal of donor anonymity in the UK, this paper considers the sig-
nificance of donor identification law and its relationship to social practices in
two European countries.
As two countries that share a common position regarding the political legit-
imation of assisted reproduction as a means of family building, and share fea-
tures of technological innovation and expertise, the UK and Belgium are of
particular interest in relation to the articulation between legal policies and social
practices in gamete donation. They have similar reputations for pioneering re-
search and facilitating the application of new reproductive technologies and
share a similar liberal approach towards medically assisted reproduction by
giving access to a wide range of technologies for diverse patient groups.5 In
particular, they have played a key role in donor conception, permitting and
practising sperm donation widely for more than five decades and egg donation
for more than two decades.
However, on the issue of donor anonymity, their legislative positions diverge
significantly. While anonymity was removed from the UK in 2005 in favour of
an ‘identity-release’ system of donation, the Belgian comprehensive law on
medically assisted reproduction, adopted in 2007, reaffirmed the obligation for
gamete and embryo donation to be anonymous, except in ‘known’ gamete
donation where donation results from an agreement between donor and recip-
In an identity release system, the donor-conceived child has the right to access to identifying
information about their donor at the age of majority. This is for instance the case in Sweden,
3
Norway, Austria, Switzerland, Netherlands and several Australian states (Eric Blyth & Lucy
Frith, ‘Access to Genetic and Biographical History in Donor Conception: An Analysis of Recent
Trends and Future Possibilities’, in: Kirsty Horsey (ed.), Revisiting the Regulation of Human
Fertilisation and Embryology (Routledge 2015), 136-52).
For instance, in Denmark. For more detail on the different systems, see Tabitha Freeman,
John B. Appleby &Vasanti Jadva, ‘Identifiable Donors and Siblings: Implications for the Future’,
4
in: Martin Richards, Guido Pennings & John B. Appleby (eds.), Reproductive Donation: Practice,
Policy and Bioethics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press 2012), 250-52.
For example, many clinics in the UK and in Belgium have a long-standing tradition of treating
lesbian couples or single individuals.
5
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ient. Researchers in these countries have also been among the first to collect
data on social attitudes to the issue of donor identification and disclosure to
donor offspring. The availability of these recent empirical studies offers the
opportunity to gain an improved understanding about the interplay between
legal changes and social attitudes and practices regarding disclosure amongst
British and Belgian donor families. A comparison between these countries
therefore allows consideration of the ways in which donor identification has
been legislated for and experienced in two socio-legal contexts.
The paper begins with an overview of the recent broader trends surrounding
donor identification and information sharing within the context of shifting
conceptualisations of personhood, genetics and identity. We then describe the
recent regulatory changes relative to gamete donation, first in the UK and then
in Belgium. This is followed by a consideration of the perceptions and experi-
ences of donor identification in each country by contrasting the findings of
studies relating to donor conception. The penultimate section focuses on the
current debates and challenges in relation to donor identification. We conclude
by arguing that greater attention should be given to the complex interplay
between legal frameworks and social practices relating to gamete donation and
highlight the need for more detailed future research to inform policy-making
in assisted reproduction.
Shifting mores in relation to disclosure and donor
identification
During the 1980s, a discourse in favour of access to informa-
tion about one’s genetic origins emerged in various Western countries. This
discourse, which asserted the child’s right to personal identity, first developed
in relation to adoption in the US and Canada where adoptees and birth parents
were pushing for the removal of confidentiality in the adoption registry.6 Not
only did this movement lead to the creation of ‘open adoptions’ in the US and
the UK where biological and adoptive parents know their respective identity
and can (under certain conditions) contact one another, but also to the adoption
of international and national laws, similar to the adoption law in the UK, giving
adopted children the right to access information about their origins. Overall,
this movement contributed to an increasing political and discursive shift in the
significance given to knowing one’s family origins.
This trend towards ‘openness’ progressively extended to the field of gamete
donation on a number of grounds including the need for knowledge about ones
‘genetic’ identity as well as a desire not to withhold information about a person’s
Wayne E. Carp, Family Matters: Secrecy and Disclosure in the History of Adoption (Cambridge,
Massachussett: Harvard University Press 1998).
6
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life story.7 Yet a number of authors have highlighted the substantial differences
between adoption and gamete donation.8 Donor-conceived children have been
planned by intending parents well before conception, whilst adopted children
have, in contrast, been relinquished by their birth parents and as a result have
been raised by another individual.9 In addition, adoptees often report feeling
aware of the fact that they are not biologically related to adoptive parents due
to physical differences within the family. They may also have to deal with the
stigma associated with this lack of physical resemblance, unlike donor-conceived
children who may have been conceived with the genetic material of one of the
intending parents and may have increased resemblance to their parents due to
any ‘matching’ done at the fertility clinic. While both adopted children and
donor-conceived children may desire more information about genetic origins,
their conception circumstances are quite different and concernsmay be distinct,
especially in terms of disclosure and identity. It is well documented that some
adoptees search for their birth parents in order to understand the context of
and reasons for the adoption.10 Notwithstanding these differences in context,
a parallel has been drawn between practices of information sharing in adoption
in order to implore the need for more openness in gamete donation.11
This shift towards identification and greater information sharing in gamete
donation has also been reinforced by the increasing attention given in recent
times to genetics, especially in terms ofmedical history and family knowledge.12
With regard to medical progress on genetic disorders, the need to have access
to or knowledge about one’s own genetic and genealogical history is increasingly
significant.13 This is also apparent in the proliferation of related phenomena
such as ‘popular genealogy’, involving a search for one’s ancestors andmapping
of family trees.14 This shift in thinking about origins as ultimately determinable
Richards et al., ‘Introduction’, in: Martin Richards, Guido Pennings & John B. Appleby (eds.),
Reproductive Donation: Practice, Policy and Bioethics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press 2012), 1-12.
7
Françoise Shenfield, ‘Truth or Dare? Anonymity: The Case For’, Progress in Reproduction 3:8
(1999); Lucy Blake et al., ‘“I Was Quite Amazed”: Donor Conception and Parent-Child Rela-
tionships from the Child’s Perspective’, Children & Society 28:6 (November 2014), 425-37.
8
Jesús Palacios & David Brodzinsky, ‘Review: Adoption Research: Trends, Topics, Outcomes’,
International Journal of Behavioral Development 34:3 (1 May 2010), 270-84.
9
Janet Carsten, ‘“Knowing Where You’ve Come From”: Ruptures and Continuities of Time and
Kinship in Narratives of Adoption Reunions’, The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute
6:4 (2000), 687-703.
10
Julia Feast, ‘Using and Not Losing the Messages from the Adoption Experience for Donor-
Assisted Conception’,Human Fertility 6:1 (February 2003), 41-45.
11
Dorothy Nelkin & SusanM. Lindee, The DNAMystique. The Gene as a Cultural Icon (New York:
Freeman and Company 1995).
12
Kaja Finkler, Experiencing the New Genetics: Family and Kinship on the Medical Frontier13
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 2000).
Fenella Cannell, ‘English Ancestors: The Moral Possibilities of Popular Genealogy’, Journal of
the Royal Anthropological Institute 17:3 (September 2011), 462-80.
14
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has inflected public and policy discourses related to family relations, kinship
and gamete donation.
The emergence of demand for non-anonymous donors amongst certain
social groups has also added to the shifting landscape of donor anonymity. An
increasing number of lesbian and single women have accessed reproductive
technologies over the last two decades, creating family situations where the
biological (donor) father is not an active presence. For some of these women,
having medical information about the donor as well as information about his
interests and personality traits to provide to the future child was of significance.15
Changes in the uptake of egg donationmay also have contributed to changes
in practices around donor anonymity. As demand has grown and freezing
technologies have advanced, egg donation has become more widely used and,
in many contexts, the number of donated eggs is not sufficient to meet the in-
creasing demand. Thismeans that waiting times can be considerable, something
which in turn has contributed to a rise in the number of women asking a close
relative or friend to become their donor16 and indirectly, has facilitated known
donation and donor identification.
Within this wider context, the culture of anonymity and non-disclosure that
had once prevailed appears to have been subject to notable change, as disclosure
and identification have increasingly been debated and encouraged in gamete
donation.17
The legal perspective: anonymity vs. identifiability
As countries at the heart of technological developments and
ethical debates regarding assisted reproductive technologies, both the UK and
Belgium have been exposed to shifting values and trends regarding information
about genetic inheritance. Legal decisions regarding the identification of donors
in these countries have, however, taken somewhat differing paths. These diver-
gent regulatory positions offer a fruitful opportunity to examine the ways in
which laws and social practicesmay, or importantly, may not be, co-constitutive.
P. Baetens & A. Brewaeys, ‘Lesbian Couples Requesting Donor Insemination: An Update of
the Knowledge with Regard to Lesbian Mother Families’,Human Reproduction Update 7:5
(October 2001), 512-19.
15
P. Baetens et al., ‘Counselling Couples and Donors for Oocyte Donation: The Decision to Use
Either Known or Anonymous Oocytes’,Human Reproduction (Oxford, England) 15:2 (February
2000), 476-84.
16
John B. Appleby, Lucy Blake & Tabitha Freeman, ‘Is Disclosure in the Best Interests of the
Children Conceived by Donation?’, in: Martin Richards, Guido Pennings & John B. Appleby
17
(eds.),Reproductive Donation: Practice, Policy and Bioethics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press 2012), 231-49; Nuffield Council on Bioethics, ‘Donor Conception: Ethical Aspects of
Information Sharing’ (London, April 2013).
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In the following section, we present some of the key features of the debates in
each country in order to highlight the differing ways information sharing in
gamete donation have evolved in each context.
The UK regulation
In 1990, the UK pioneered the legal regulation of assisted re-
production by adopting the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act. This Act
made anonymity mandatory for donor conception18 but fertility clinics were
required to collect some non-identifying information about the donor which
could be released upon request by the donor offspring at the age of 18. There
was, however, no state mandated possibility to identify the donor at this time.
Moreover, parents were usually advised not to tell the children about the circum-
stances of their conception.
Fifteen years later, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority
(Disclosure of Donor Information) Regulation 2004 abolished donor anonymity
in the UK. This change meant that from 2005, offspring conceived through
gamete donation were given the right to access identifying information about
their donor and thus to make it potentially possible for them to contact their
donor at the age of 18 (if their details are up to date). This ‘identity-release’
donation system was henceforth mandatory for everyone who wished to use
gamete or embryo donation in a clinical setting. This also meant that people
who wanted to donate gametes must also agree to be identifiable and to accept
the possibility of being contacted by the offspring at some point in the future.19
In the policy debates which led to the removal of donor anonymity in the
UK, a number of claims were made regarding the need for donor offspring to
be able to access identifying information about their donor. As described above,
those lobbying for the rights of adoptees also advocated for the rights of donor-
conceived people to have equivalent information about their origins. Progar
(the British Association of Social Workers’ Project Group on Assisted Concep-
tion) and the national charity, the Children’s Society, advocated for legal changes
with regard to the removal of donor anonymity in the interests and rights of
donor-conceived individuals and succeeded in raising public and political atten-
tion on this issue.20 The public awareness actions started by the Children’s
Previously the Family Law Reform Act adopted in 1987 had allowed the intended parents to
be the legal parents of the resulting child, while preventing the donor from making claim to
or assuming any rights or responsibilities towards any resulting children.
18
It is also possible in the UK for ‘known’ donors to be used, whereby the identity of the donor
(often a familymember) is known to the recipients at the point of treatment, unlike the identity
19
release system in which intending parents are only given non-identifying information at the
point of donation.
Ilke Turkmendag, ‘TheDonor-Conceived Child’s “Right to Personal Identity”: The Public Debate
on Donor Anonymity in the United Kingdom’, Journal of Law and Society 39:1 (2012), 58-75.
20
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Society occurred almost simultaneously as two donor-conceived individuals
(Joanna Rose and ‘EM’) went to court in order to claim access to information
about their donor under the Human Rights Act 1998.21 These two factors led
the UK government to launch a public consultation in 2002, followed by con-
sultation exercises by the HFEA with clinics and donors, designed to consider
the amount of information that should be made available to donor-conceived
people and their parents.22 Though responses to the consultation were mixed,
following this exercise, the UK government revised the law in order to make
anonymous gamete donation illegal. As Frith has suggested, these legal changes
were therefore based on a parallel being drawn between gamete donation and
adoption, as well as the principle that the ability to identify one’s donor was in
the ‘best interests of the child’.23 Donor anonymity therefore emerged in the
UK as a social problem and saw legal change on the basis of these conceptual-
isations.24
According to advocates of the removal of donor anonymity, granting donor-
conceived individuals access to information about their conception would allow
them access to their medical history, information about family relatedness, and
would ensure fulfilment of identity.25 These arguments were also in line with
the concern about the risks of genetically related sexual partners and the desire
to avoid unwitting incest at a time when the number of offspring conceived
with gamete donations was increasing.26
Overall, the government emphasised the priority granted to the child’s in-
terests in its decision to change the law in 2004 ‘rather than the best interests
of the medical profession or the best interests of those going for treatment’.27
It has been argued that the debates were ‘conducted with very limited empirical
Nuffield Council on Bioethics, ‘Donor Conception: Ethical Aspects of Information Sharing’
(London, April 2013), 22.
21
‘Donor Information Consultation: providing information about Gamete or Embryo Donors’,




Lucy Frith, ‘The Limits of Evidence: Evidence Based Policy and the Removal of Gamete Donor
Anonymity in the UK’,Monash Bioethics Review 33:1 (March 2015), 29-44.
23
Turkmendag, ‘The Donor-Conceived Child’s “Right to Personal Identity”: The Public Debate,
on Donor Anonymity in the United Kingdom’, op. cit.
24
Nuffield Council on Bioethics, ‘Donor Conception: Ethical Aspects of Information Sharing’
(London, April 2013); Turkmendag, ‘The Donor-Conceived Child’s “Right to Personal Identity”:
The Public Debate on Donor Anonymity in the United Kingdom’, op. cit.
25
Jeanette Edwards, ‘Incorporating Incest: Gamete, Body and Relation in Assisted Conception’,
Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 10:4 (2004), 755-74; Enric Porqueres i Gené &
26
Jérôme Wilgaux, ‘Incest, Embodiment, Genes and Kinship’, in: Jeanette Edwards & Carles
Salazar (eds.), European Kinship in the Age of Biotechnology (New York & Oxford: Berghahn
Books 2009), 112-27.
Lucy Frith, ‘The Limits of Evidence’, op. cit., 39.27
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evidence about the implications of open-identity donation for those involved’28
and, some have suggested, without effective consultation processes.29
The direct outcomes of the legal change regarding identifiable donation will
remain unknown at least until 2023, when the first donor-conceived individuals
will have the opportunity to access identifying information on their donor.
Whilst it is currently mandatory for pre-treatment counselling in the UK to in-
clude a recommendation that children should be told about their donor-con-
ceived origins,30 there is no legal obligation to do so and therefore childrenmay
not be given this information. Open-identity donation can therefore encourage
or facilitate the parents’ disclosure but it doesn’t prevent non-disclosure.31 In
other words, whether or not parents use an identifiable donor, they will still
have to decide to tell the child or not about his or her donor conception.
In the ten years since the removal of donor anonymity in the UK, there has
been a shift in the way donor services are organised and a demonstrable will
to improve the experience of donors, donor parents and donor-conceived indi-
viduals under the new system. Recent initiatives such as the HFEA’s Donor
Strategy Group32 and the launch of the National Sperm Bank33 are being imple-
mented in order to further embed the current system and to address donor
shortages.Moreover, in 2012, and following public consultation, donor compen-
sation levels were also increased in the UK, in part, to address this shortage.34
The Belgian regulation
While medically assisted reproduction has been widely prac-
ticed in Belgium since the 1960s, its regulation has been largely confined to
that of professional oversight and guidance. As a result clinicians and researchers
were granted a considerable degree of scientific autonomy and any bioethical
and religious orientations were respected.35 It was as recently as July 2007 that
Freeman, Appleby & Jadva, ‘Identifiable Donors and Siblings: Implications for the Future’.28
Turkmendag, ‘The Donor-Conceived Child’s “Right to Personal Identity”: The Public Debate
on Donor Anonymity in the United Kingdom’, op. cit.
29
A 2008 amendment to the 1990 Act provides legislative endorsement for early parental disclo-
sure (Section 13(6C)).
30
Freeman, Appleby & Jadva, ‘Identifiable Donors and Siblings: Implications for the Future’;
Jennifer Readings et al., ‘Secrecy, Disclosure and Everything in-between: Decisions of Parents
31
of Children Conceived by Donor Insemination, Egg Donation and Surrogacy’, Reproductive
Biomedicine Online 22:5 (May 2011), 485-95.
See: www.hfea.gov.uk/7138.html.32
See: www.veryspecialman.co.uk/.33
HFEA, CH(12)01 (Implementation of the outcomes of the Donation Review), January 2012.
Available at: www.hfea.gov.uk/6966.html.
34
Nathalie Schiffino, Célina Ramjoué & Frédéric Varone, ‘Biomedical Policies in Belgium and
Italy: From Regulatory Reluctance to Policy Changes’,West European Politics 32:3 (2009), 559-
85.
35
Journal of Medical Law and Ethics 2015-3182
HERBRAND AND HUDSON
a comprehensive law on medically assisted reproduction and the disposition
of supernumerary embryos and gametes was adopted in Belgium.36 This law
primarily aimed at formalising existing clinical practices and limiting possible
excesses. The law permits a broad range of reproductive techniques, such as
post-mortem insemination or preimplantation genetic diagnosis, and allows
these techniques to be offered to any couple and single woman under the age
of 48.37 This liberal law is therefore in line with existing clinical practices and
attitudes within some Belgian clinics.
The 2007 law also reinforced the obligation for embryo and gamete donation
to remain anonymous, after an intense debate on this issue in Belgium. An
exception was made for certain cases of gamete donation where donors do not
have to remain anonymous provided they result from an agreement between
the donor and the recipient. The aim of this exception was, it seems, in reality
to facilitate the supply of egg donors, which constitutes a scarce resource, by
allowing egg donation from a familymember or a friend.38 Indeed, prior to this,
most women in Belgium preferred to receive or donate eggs in circumstances
where the donors and recipient knew one other.39 This means that in the case
of Belgian egg donation, as in ‘known donation’ in the UK, some intending
parents will know who the donor is from the start. This possibility of known
donation is regarded and presented as an exception to the prevailing rule in
Belgium where clinics are obliged to guarantee the anonymity of donors in
rendering inaccessible all information both identifying (e.g. names) and non-
identifying (e.g. physical characteristics) relating to donors. The anonymous
model generally followed in Belgium contrasts with UK practices where not
only do clinics collect and make available medical and physical information
about the donors, but also encourage them to provide a personal and biograph-
ical description of themselves which will be accessible to donation families at
the point of donation.40
A crucial argument used to justify the maintenance of donor anonymity in
Belgium was the priority given to the autonomy of parents.41 According to this
principle, parents should be able to decide whether or not and how they wish
A first law on in-vitro embryos was nevertheless adopted in May 2003. It authorises the pro-36
curing of stem cells from residual embryos, therapeutic cloning and the creation of embryos
for research purposes. Only reproductive cloning is forbidden.
Formore details on the content of the new law, see Guido Pennings, ‘Belgian Law onMedically
Assisted Reproduction and theDisposition of Supernumerary Embryos andGametes’, European
Journal of Health Law 14 (2007), 251-60.
37
Nicole Gallus, Le Droit de La Filiation. Rôle de La Vérité Socio-Affective et de La Volonté En Droit
Belge (Bruxelles: Larcier 2009); Pennings, ‘Belgian Law on Medically Assisted Reproduction
and the Disposition of Supernumerary Embryos and Gametes’, op. cit.
38
Baetens et al., ‘Counselling Couples and Donors for Oocyte Donation’, op. cit.39
Nuffield Council on Bioethics, ‘Donor Conception: Ethical Aspects of Information Sharing’,
(London, April 2013).
40
Gallus, Le Droit de La Filiation. Rôle de La Vérité Socio-Affective et de La Volonté En Droit Belge.41
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to tell the child about the nature of their conception. In this model anonymity
goes hand in hand with the legislative will to privilege family ties based on
parental commitment and daily involvement.
In line with this argument was also the will to respect parents’ rights to a
private life and to protect their intimacy. The intention of Belgian policymakers
was to help donor-conceived children integrate directly into their family without
revealing the medical intervention needed for its conception and without the
parents fearing the intrusion of the donor in their family. It also intended to
prevent the possible disruption to the child and its parents caused by information
about and contact with an additional parental figure. Likewise, another aimwas
to guarantee discretion towards the donor who acted as a genitor and not as a
parent. The law was therefore intended to protect the donor against the risk of
parental obligations and intrusion in his or her private life at a later stage.
A specific prohibition relating to sharing information about embryo donation
was also justified by the need to prevent commercialisation of embryos between
donors and recipients. However, as Guido Pennings points out, if this was an
important reason for justifying anonymity, this rule should also have been ex-
tended to egg and sperm donation.42
The decision to retain anonymity was also made to prohibit access to non-
identifiable, non-medical information in order to avoid any genetic determinism,
whereby the child’s character, for example, might be attributed to the donor’s
genes.43 This differs from the UK where the significance of genetics has poten-
tially been reinforced through policies which appear to imply determining links
between the genetics and personality of the donor: for example, through
providing the donor-conceived family with a personal and biographical descrip-
tion of the donor.44
Finally, anonymity policies were also justified in Belgium for practical
reasons, since they also helped to preserve the number of donations and were
therefore suggested as important in avoiding a donor shortage. Although this
was also an important concern for medical groups in the UK, this factor was
not taken into consideration by the UK government in its consultation.45
As in the UK context, practices may not align with laws, meaning that even
though Belgian law does not allow access to the donor’s identity and may
therefore assume a position of non-disclosure within families, this does not
Pennings, ‘Belgian Law on Medically Assisted Reproduction and the Disposition of Supernu-
merary Embryos and Gametes’, op. cit.
42
Belgian Chamber, ‘Rapport Concernant Le Projet de Loi Relatif à La ProcréationMédicalement
Assistée et à La Destination Des Embryons Surnuméraires et Des Gamètes’, Session
2006/2007, 9 March 2007, 41.
43
Though it is also the case that this information is provided in order that donor families can
incorporate this information in to coherent ‘conception stories’.
44
Turkmendag, ‘The Donor-Conceived Child’s “Right to Personal Identity”: The Public Debate
on Donor Anonymity in the United Kingdom’, op. cit.
45
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mean that donor conception parents won’t discuss with their children the cir-
cumstances of their conception. However, in Belgium, the implication of dis-
closure is that the child will know about the lack of a biological tie with one of
his or her parents, but won’t be able to access any information regarding the
donor.
Contrasting the UK and Belgian legislative landscapes offer an insight into
the differing prioritisation of rights and interests in debates and policy about
donor anonymity. We can observe that in the UK precedence was given to the
rights and interests of donor-conceived children to know their genetic origins,46
whilst in Belgium, the rights of parents and donors superseded the rights of
the child on the grounds of the principles of autonomy and a right to privacy.
Disclosure and non-disclosure in practice: research in the
UK and Belgium
In this section we consider the practices and attitudes of donor
conception parents regarding donor information sharing,47 by providing an
overview of the studies conducted on this issue in the UK and Belgium. While
accurate figures are not available given the difficulties in collecting data about
children who have not been told about their donor conception,48 the qualitative
studies available provide noteworthy insights on perceptions of this issue. There
is still a significant gap in the evidence base but these studies offer a valuable
snapshot of the complex negotiations and variability surrounding decisions
regarding disclosure and non-disclosure within donor conception families and
enable a consideration of the ways these practices articulate with local laws.
In the UK, the on-going longitudinal research conducted with donor-con-
ceived families by Susan Golombok and her team from Cambridge University,
shows that at age 7, 28% of sperm donation parents and 41% of egg donation
parents, were in the process of disclosing information about their conception
to their child.49 This trend seems to continue at age 10,50 with a majority of
Lucy Frith, ‘Gamete Donation and Anonymity: The Ethical and Legal Debate’,Human Repro-
duction 16 (2001), 818, 820-22; Lucy Frith, ‘Beneath the Rhetoric: The Role of Rights in the
Practice of Non-Anonymous Gamete Donation’, Bioethics 15 (2001), 473, 477.
46
In this paper we do not provide a broader discussion about donor-conceived children (see for
example Martin Richards, Guido Pennings & John B. Appleby (ed.), Reproductive Donation:
47
Practice, Policy and Bioethics, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press 2012)) but instead
focus specifically on the question of disclosure.
Nuffield Council on Bioethics, ‘Donor Conception: Ethical Aspects of Information Sharing’,
(London, April 2013).
48
S. Golombok, J. Readings, L. Blake, P. Casey, L. Mellish, A. Marks & V. Jadva, ‘Children Con-
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7’, Journal of Family Psychology 25 (2011), 230-239.
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sperm donor parents in particular choosing not to disclose the conception to
the child.51 This study also highlights the need to distinguish between the initial
intention to disclose and the actual process of letting the child know about the
use of gamete donation. Indeed, while 37 out of 68 donation parents intended
to disclose when the child was aged one, only about half of them had done so
six years later.52Moreover, for some of these parents disclosure was only partial.
They had told the child about the use of reproductive technologies, but not
about the donor.53 Most of these children are therefore not aware that one or
both of their legal parents is not his or her genetic parent. Another study con-
ducted by the team at Cambridge on donor-conceived children in several
European countries showed that amongst the UK sample, donor-conceived
parents who had not disclosed to their children at age 12 tended not to do so
later on. At age 18, only about a tenth of the children who had not been told at
age 12 knew about the circumstances of their birth.54 It is important to note that
these trends differ in families formed by single mothers who used sperm
donation in which, according to Murray and Golombok’s study, 90% of single
mothers intended to tell their child.55 This proportion is even higher in donor
conception families headed by same-sex couples, in which all parents, according
to studies conducted in the UK, Belgium and the Netherlands, intended to
disclose.56
Drawing on interviews with donor conception parents and grandparents, a
recent UK sociological study has described how even in family situations where
parents are in favour of openness (heterosexual and lesbian couples) telling the
child about his or her conception may prove to be much more difficult than
Nuffield Council on Bioethics, ‘Donor Conception: Ethical Aspects of Information Sharing’
(London, April 2013), 57.
51
Readings et al., ‘Secrecy, disclosure and everything in-between: decisions of parents of children
conceived by donor insemination, egg donation and surrogacy’, op. cit.
52
Ibid.53
L. Owen & Susan Golombok, ‘Families Created by Assisted Reproduction: Parent-Child Rela-
tionships in Late Adolescence’, Journal of Adolescence 32:4 (2009), 835-48.
54
C. Murray & S. Golombok, ‘Going it alone: solo mothers and their infants conceived by donor
insemination’, American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 75:2 (2005), 242-53.
55
Fiona Maccallum & Susan Golombok, ‘Children Raised in Fatherless Families from Infancy:
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Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, and Allied Disciplines 45:8 (November 2004), 1407-
19; M. Stevens et al., ‘Openness in Lesbian-Mother Families Regarding Mother’s Sexual Ori-
entation and Child’s Conception by Donor Insemination’, Journal of Reproductive and Infant
Psychology 21:4 (1 November 2003), 347-62; K. Vanfraussen, I. Ponjaert-Kristoffersen & A.
Brewaeys, ‘An Attempt to Reconstruct Children’s Donor Concept: A Comparison between
Children’s and Lesbian Parents’ Attitudes towards Donor Anonymity’,Human Reproduction
16:9 (1 September 2001), 2019-25.
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expected in practice, especially given the impact it has on the wider family.
Some parentsmay therefore be hesitant or feel uncomfortable about disclosure.57
Overall, it would appear that single women and same sex couples are most
likely to disclose, and that whilst the number of heterosexual parents in the UK
who are willing to disclose or intend to disclose is increasing, they nevertheless
remain a minority of the whole of parents who used gamete donation.58 It is
also worth noting that the impact of the legal change on disclosure in the fam-
ilies who have used gamete donation after 2005 is still unknown. However,
according to the Nuffield Council on Bioethics’s report, ‘preliminary findings
from a study being carried out by Freeman T, Zadeh S, Smith V and Golombok
S suggest that the removal of anonymity has not had an immediate impact on
disclosure rates’.59
In Belgium, an early study by Baetens et al. on egg donation indicated that
two thirds of a sample of 144 couples opted for known donation and one third
for anonymous donation. One of the main reasons to choose known donation
was the fear of using unknown genetic material. Amongst the couples who
used egg donation, the proportion of couples intending to disclose later on was
similar to those who did not want to disclose (43%).60
More recently, another Belgian study on egg donation drawing on interviews
with 135 recipient couples and 90 egg donors reported similar rates of disclosure
and non-disclosure amongst donor parents, regardless of whether they used
an anonymous or identifiable donor.61 Half of parents using known donation
(42 couples) and half of those used an anonymous donor (45 couples) did, in-
deed, not want to tell the child about his or her conception because of the fear
of stigmatisation or rejection within their social circle, as well as to avoid jeop-
ardising themother-child relationship. Disclosure was also sometimes regarded
as a threat to the child’s psychological well-being.62 The paper also indicates
that ‘among Europeans (90 couples), 50%were in favour of disclosure compared
with only 8.9% of recipients from North or sub-Saharan Africa (45 couples)’.63
In some religious or ethnic communities, using gamete donation was taboo
and disclosing the information could be very harmful and stigmatising not only
Petra Nordqvist, ‘The Drive for Openness in Donor Conception: Disclosure and The Trouble
with Real Life’, International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 28:3 (2014), 321-38.
57
Appleby, Blake & Freeman, ‘Is Disclosure in the Best Interests of the Children Conceived by
Donation?’, op. cit.
58
Tabitha Freeman, personal communication, 11 February 2013, indicated in Nuffield Council
on Bioethics, ‘Donor Conception: Ethical Aspects of Information Sharing’ (London, April 2013),
58.
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for the child but also for the social father and the mother.64 As a result, it re-
mains unclear whether parents who can choose between an anonymous and a
non-anonymous egg donor would prefer to disclose more information or not.65
The authors therefore recommend ‘maintaining access to different types of
oocyte donation’.66
As for spermdonation, a qualitative study drawing on interviewswith Belgian
couples who had used an anonymous sperm donor has shown that once the
child was born, most heterosexual couples ‘avoided talking about the donor
because it was perceived as disrupting men’s growing confidence in their posi-
tion as father’.67 This was not dependent on whether or not they had disclosed
but rather reflected the couples’ priority to protect the father from possible re-
minders of the donor. By contrast, attitudes towards the donor amongst lesbian
couples whowere interviewed in the study weremore diverse.While disclosure
about donor conception was the norm, there were differences in the ways the
donor was constructed, with some couples portraying him as a person, especially
as the child grew older, and others only considering themale genetic procreator
as a means to the conception and tended to ignore him in discussions about
family relationships.68
The studies conducted to date on gamete donation practices in the UK and
in Belgium demonstrate that despite a change of attitudes in professional
counselling towards more openness, many heterosexual parents have not dis-
closed this information to their child or have expressed ambivalence or difficulty
in doing so. A currently unknown proportion of donor-conceived children are
therefore unaware that one or both of their legal parents is not his or her genetic
parent. This proportion seems slightly more significant amongst children
conceived using sperm donation than egg donation.69 However, studies con-
ducted in several countries also suggest that ‘children who are not informed
have positive relationships with their parents and develop normally, which
Ethnic and cultural differences in public perceptions of disclosure in gamete donation have
also been noted in the UK context (see Nicky Hudson & Lorraine Culley, ‘“Knock knock, you’re
64
my mummy”: anonymity, identification and gamete donation in British South Asian commu-
nities’, in: Hampshire and Simpson (eds.), Assisted Reproductive Technologies in the Third Phase.
Global Encounters and Emerging Moral Worlds (Oxford: Berghahn Books 2015) 214-229).).
This will also be the conclusion of another study conducted later in the US study on disclosure
in egg donation (Dorothy A. Greenfeld & Susan Caruso Klock, ‘Disclosure Decisions among
65
Known and Anonymous Oocyte Donation Recipients’, Fertility and Sterility 81:6 (June 2004),
1565-71).
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shows that this specific family secret does not always have an impact on the
child’s life’.70 It is nonetheless worth noting that without more research it is
difficult to demonstrate the impact that disclosure might or might not have for
those involved andmoreover that access to the perceptions of those who do not
know they are donor-conceived, is of course impossible.71
Current debates and challenges
Despite the changes to the legislation of gamete donation in
the UK and Belgium described in this paper, debate continues and suggests
that there are several issues still at stake in both contexts. First, one effect of
the legal shift in favour of open-identity donation is the potential ensuing
shortage of gamete donors, which some have argued has been characteristic of
the UK context in recent years.72 Although evidence suggests that donations
are on the increase due to changing donor profiles and improvements in recruit-
ment strategies,73 there is still not sufficient supply to meet increasing de-
mands,74 leading some to travel overseas in pursuit of donor treatment.75
Moreover, some have proposed that an identity release system has contrib-
uted to the genetisation of the family by suggesting that genetic information is
crucial for well-being and by giving priority to genetic relationships. Ilke
Turkendag notes that ‘bymarginalizing donor-conceived children, and enforcing
a deeply-rooted view that genetic linkage is indeed very important, it is possible
that the United Kingdom’s disclosure policy compounds stigma and increases
subterfuge rather than openness’.76
Information sharing and donor identification have continued to be central
to regulatory and legal discussions in both countries. In the UK, for example,
a call for evidence was launched by the UK Nuffield Council on Bioethics on
the ethical aspects of donor information sharing in 2011. It looked at ‘issues of
privacy, openness, and access to information, and the implications of each of
Inez Raes, An Ravelingien & Guido Pennings, ‘Donor Conception Disclosure: Directive or
Non-Directive Counselling?’, Journal of Bioethical Inquiry, in press.
70
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Bioethics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press 2012), 90-111.
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these for the individuals, families and groups affected by donor conception’.77
The working group’s conclusions were somewhat controversial in that it argued
that it is not the role of state authorities to ensure that donor-conceived individu-
als are told about the nature of their conception, but rather that efforts should
be made to encourage an environment where donor conception could be dis-
cussed openly and valued as one amongst a number of ways of family-building.78
Presently in Belgium, the issue of information sharing in gamete donation
remains controversial, against a growing significance of having information
about one’s genetic origins. This has been influenced most notably by open
donation policies in the Netherlands and claimsmade by donor offspring which,
as in the UK, have requested the ban of anonymous donation and access to the
identity of the donor. The question of the regulation of donor conception was
also reignited amidst recent discussions about possible future regulation of
surrogacy which is currently unregulated in Belgium.
In 2014, a law proposal79 was submitted to the Belgian Parliament in order
to implement five different possibilities in terms of information sharing:
1) known donation; 2) access to non-identifiable information until the child is
18 and then access to the donor’s identity, 3) access to non-identifiable informa-
tion only, 4) no information on the donor until the child is 18 and then access
the donor’s identity and 5) anonymous donor. The prospective parent could
therefore choose which donation option suits them best, while respecting the
donors’ preferences in terms of involvement. By offering more flexibility for
all involved, this proposal also seeks to avoid significant gamete shortages. The
primary aim of this recent law proposal is nonetheless to promote openness,
which is illustrated by the suggestion that clinical counsellors be obliged to in-
form parents-to-be about the possible negative consequences of non-disclosure.
In February 2015, a range of experts were invited to share their views on these
possibilities. The hearing was followed by the submission of two other, more
radical, law proposals, which aimed at banning donor anonymity and at creating
a specific organisation responsible for centralising and organising the sharing
of donor information.80Researchers at the University of Ghent in Belgium also
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recently held an international symposium on gamete donation,81 in whichmost
presentations and discussions focused on the relative challenges and dilemmas
associated with anonymous and non-anonymous donation. These political and
academic debates reflect the increasing attention granted to this issue in Bel-
gium.
Conclusion
In theUK and Belgium the legal approach to donor identifica-
tion has evolved in divergent ways, despite the fact that both countries share a
common liberal framework regarding assisted reproduction. In Belgium,
autonomy and freedom for intending parents have been maintained and prior-
itised: paradoxically the implication of this being that those who want to use
gamete donation to form a family have little choice with respect to donor char-
acteristics and there is no possibility for donor-conceived individuals to access
information about the donor, either at the time of donation or in the future. In
contrast, in the UK, donation policies place importance on allowing children
conceived through gamete donation access to information about their origins.
However, by allowing parents autonomy regarding the decision to disclose, this
right is not guaranteed. This creates significant disparities, therefore, between
donor-conceived children who have been told about their conception and will
be able to access information about their donor’s identity and those who have
not been told.
In the ten years since the removal of donor anonymity in the UK, relative
political approaches to donor identification and practices related to information
sharing have evolved and are continually challenged by the diversity and com-
plexity of family situations. In attempting to overcome these challenges, some
commentators have argued for a ‘double track’ approach to donation, in which
the autonomy of parents and donors could be respected. It is argued that in this
model, both parties would have the possibility to choose what suits them best
and clinics wouldmatch donors and recipients according to their preferences.82
One of its main disadvantages however, is the difference between the rights of
offspring who have access to their donor’s identity and those who don’t have
this possibility, since the choice about with which method to engage still lies
with the recipients and donors. This double-track system was temporarily
adopted in the Netherlands and is now on-going in Denmark. In both cases, it
‘Donor conception: An unfamiliar path to a normal family?’ Symposium organised by the re-
search group on social and genetic parenthood from Ghent University, 27-28 August 2015.
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has not been implemented for a long enough period to enable conclusions on
the implications to be drawn.
With respect to social practices, research about experiences and perceptions
of donor identification and information disclosure remains limited. Almost all
of what is known about those who are donor-conceived comes from small-scale
studies, even though the UK or Belgium were pioneers in this respect.83 Given
this, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions about the implications of donor
identification, particularly with regards to the articulation of the law with social
practices. Current studies however do appear to illustratemore diversity regard-
ing disclosure practices amongst families, than has been suggested by various
stakeholders in public debate. Despite this, the findings of such research has
not, to date, played a significant role in shaping policymaking,84 demonstrating
a potential lack of effective and systematic dialogue between social scientists
and law-making in this field. This is striking given the vibrancy of the political
and legislative debate and change in these countries in recent years. If legislative
changes are to be made which are reflective of and consistent with social prac-
tices and lived experiences, further detailed, longitudinal research is needed to
better understand the social perceptions of those engagedwith donor conception
and the meanings that people give to disclosure.
Nuffield Council on Bioethics, ‘Donor Conception: Ethical Aspects of Information Sharing’,
op. cit.
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Abstract
The complexity of the contemporary corporeal gift has ramifications
for understanding social exchange mechanisms, donor communities and the potential
ethical concerns. This paper deconstructs modern day blood donation and reveals, as
a result, tensions in what was once the safe world of the easily identifiable altruistic
‘no questions asked’ donor, with few ethical problems. It aims to realign classical so-
ciological and anthropological theories of gift exchange to blood donation thus enabling
further understanding of the donor world.
This paper focuses on the theoretical implications for reframing the process of
blood donation in the UK and the issues concerned with whose blood it is, what rela-
tionship the donation has with the donor body and with wider society in the blood
product world.
The author re-examines social exchange theory and alienation theory to argue
that blood, once donated, has become inalienable from the donor and the nature of
donation is today more of a covenant than the unfettered gift that it used to be.
Increasingly, donors want to know where their blood has gone, and who has been
given it, thus contesting the notion of alienation in relation to donated blood. This,
it is argued, poses ethical issues for the concept of voluntary blood donation, the nature
of consent, and the gift relationship today.
1. Introduction
The complexity of the contemporary corporeal gift has rami-
fications for understanding the concept of the gift exchange mechanisms on
which voluntary blood donation is thought to rest. The changing landscape of
contemporary blood donation and the ensuing ‘blood economies’ which have
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emerged raise potential ethical concerns. Previous research1 has referred to the
situation succinctly when saying mistaking an object intended as a gift for a
commodity will lead to tensions. Blood commodification has also fallen further
under the new auspices of biotechnology; becoming medicalised into a new
speciality of ‘blood component therapy’ with plasma-derivedmedicinal products
being utilised in preference to whole blood transfusions.2 As such, the gift rela-
tionship as identified by Titmuss now falls under the lens of bioethics for
scrutiny.3
This paper deconstructs modern day blood donation against this backdrop
of commercialisation of the ‘gift’, and reveals, as a result, tensions in what was
once the safe world of the easily identifiable altruistic ‘no questions asked’
donor. With little ethical debate, contemporary blood donors are becoming
aware of the power and the value of their gift, and acceptance of the gift rela-
tionship has become problematic for donors where blood donated at blood
donor sessions is used for a purpose unknown by the giver. Contemporary
donors want to keep some moral ownership whilst giving, thus indicating that
the donation of blood today is more of a covenant than an unfettered gift.4 This
paper seeks to problematise this area for further debate and queries the nature
of blood donation consent in the light of the new bio-value of blood once re-
moved from the host.
The author re-examines social exchange theory5 and alienation theory6 to
argue that blood, once donated, has become inalienable from the donor in a
way which changes the concept of blood given as an unfettered gift and re-ex-
amines themeanings and purpose behind the new blood donationworld where
donors have no notion of or say in the intended recipients of their gift, and re-
flects on the ethics of the contemporary giving relationship.
D. Latiner-Vos, The Practical Organization of Moral Transactions: Gift Giving, Market Exchange,
Credit, and the Making of Diaspora Bonds (2013).
1
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279, updated June 2014 (last accessed 11/2/2015).
2
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of Economics and Political Science, 1997).
3
M. Petrini, Between Altruism and Commercialisation: Some Ethics Aspects of Blood Donation (Ann
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Demands for blood and blood products increase annually to the point where
the United Kingdom uses 8,000 units per day,7 meaning that society places a
high value on blood.8 The average price of blood is £ 122 per unit in the UK,9
with the WHO reporting the number of donations per annum at 108 million.10
Starr (1998) argues that as blood has become a pharmaceutical product it has
come to symbolise a new social system.11 Commodification of blood and its
products, and the technology associated with this activity, is a fast growing
business. Bio Products Laboratories (BPL) manufactures a range of products
from human blood and supports markets in 45 countries.12 The Blood 2020
strategy has as its aim to provide not only blood, but blood components that
are needed for stem cell testing.13 All of these changes impact on the social
system inwhich blood donation operates, thus affecting the traditional ambiance
in which blood is given and collected. Donors potentially understand that they
are giving blood and not blood products, and see their gift as inalienable. Thus
this new commodified and commercialised social system of blood donation
will especially impact the marketing required to retain and attract donors.
2. Reframing the Gift
This paper first focuses on the theoretical implications for
reframing the process of blood donation in the UK and the issues concerned
with whose blood it is and what relationship the donation has with the donor
body and wider society in the spare-part blood product world. Relating classical
sociological and anthropological theories of gift exchange to blood donation
enables further understanding of the contemporary blood donor world, as un-
derstandings of the rationale for becoming and remaining a blood donor being
a form of altruism become challenged with the notion of ‘keeping whist giving’
appearing in the narratives of donation. Appadurai has written about the social
life of things and blood has entered its own sociability as a result of the new
www.nhs.uk/Conditions/Blood-donation/Pages/Introduction.aspx/ National Health Service
(last accessed 12/10/2015).
7
D. Starr, Blood: An Epic History of Medicine and Commerce (New York: A. Knopf 1998).8
www.nhsbt.nhs.uk/annualreview/blood-supply/ National Health Service Blood Transfusion
Annual review 12-13, (last accessed 12/10/2015).
9
www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs279/en/ World Health Organisation, Fact Sheet no.
279 (2015) (last accessed 12/10/2015).
10
D. Starr, Blood: An Epic History of Medicine and Commerce (New York: Harper Collins
1998/2002).
11
www.bpl.co.uk/ Bio Products Labortories, (last accessed 2/10/2015).12
National Health Service Blood Transfusion, Blood 20/20. A strategy for the blood supply in England
and North Wales (2014).
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life it takes on after leaving the body of its donor.14 This has relevance when
reflecting the social process of donating blood and understanding it through
the lens of the gift relationship. Moreover, the nature of the donation is unclear
in relation to what the gift becomes as a result of the commodification blood
fractionation process and whom the gift ultimately goes to.
Douglas also alludes to the ideas of exchange in society, she argues: ‘Gift
cycles engage persons in permanent commitments that articulate the dominant
institutions.’15 This can be applied to biomedicine, and for example to the insti-
tution for National Health Service Blood and Transplant (NHSBT), and may
result in an ethical impasse. Douglas argues that perception of symbols and
their interpretation is socially determined and that this perception can alter
over time.16 She goes on to underline that the social body ‘constrains’ the ways
in which the physical body is perceived and that this results in continuous ex-
changes between the two bodies about the current meaning endowed. Blood,
as a natural symbol, undergoes this continuous cycle, thus current meanings
of blood need to be reinterpreted. The capacity to buy, sell and commercially
fractionate blood has altered the nature of blood from what was a symbol of
human kinship and life forces.
This concept of blood being a natural symbol of exchange and kinship can
be re-examined in relation to aspects of recent discourse, which is reflective of
the ways in which society has begun to use blood and therefore what blood
represents.17 Donated blood is symbolic of both bio-hazard and gift, and is a
medicine in its own right. Blood being both a symbol of good and risk brings
questions to the understanding of the overly simplistic interpretation of the
contemporary gift relationship. Berking argues that the giving of gifts binds
everything together, gifts and gifting being representative of social synthesis
which irrevocably unifies economics, power and, interestingly, morality.18
In furthering sociological clarification of the gift relationship, Simmel has
argued that society exists where a number of individuals enter into interaction.19
This interaction is purposeful in achieving desired aims for the mutual benefit
of that society, and it creates subsequent unity or socialisation therein. Therefore
A. Appadurai, The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press 1998).
14
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unity is derived from the sum of interactions. Simmel’s views on exchange are
pertinent to this paper, in that a characteristic of pure exchange must be that
the sum of value to each party must be greater afterward than before. In the
case of donated blood, therefore, the pooling and reconstitution of blood into
its products would constitute pure exchange rather than the donation of the
blood itself. This is because in contemporary society blood has greater value
when out of the body than in it; moreover the value further increases during
the process of fractionation. But the donation by the donor may not be pure
exchange as the sum of value to the donor after the gift has beenmade may not
be greater, as it was in the past, due to the loss of understanding of where and
to whom the gift has been given. Contemporary methods for using and repack-
aging donated blood change the nature and form of donated blood into a differ-
ent ‘gift’ and have shifted much of the value in the gift exchange away from the
donor.
Understanding, then, that the gift is altered or changed by becoming com-
modified, Coleman argued that such commodification would reduce the prop-
erties required for blood donation to be a gift and may dilute it.20 Mauss states
that the gifts are, in the final analysis, compulsory social actions, even if given
in the guise of voluntary politeness; in fact strictly compulsory on pain of private
or public warfare. This applies in relative contemporary terms to blood donation
as a National Health Service without blood is an unthinkable prospect.
Mauss further tells the observer about the group relationships, in particular
the role of gifting in creating and maintaining relationship between groups,
arguing that blood has gone further in the medicalisation relationship and that
it has indeed become a technical tool separate from, or in addition to, the body.
If the body, and therefore blood, has been acknowledged as the ‘natural tool of
man’, it can now also be said to be the natural ‘marketplace of man’. Increas-
ingly, donors want to knowwhere their blood has gone, andwho has been given
it, thus contesting the notion of alienation in relation to donated blood and
shifting the paradigm to one of inalienation. This poses ethical issues for the
concept of voluntary blood donation and the use of the raw gift for purposes
unbeknown to the donor such as re-gifting or selling on.
Moody, also, argues for a rethink on serial reciprocity.21 This has ramifica-
tions for the concept of inalienability espoused by Weiner and whether blood
donors are related to the spirit of their gift after it has been not only donated,
S. Coleman, ‘The Charismatic Gift’, Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 10 (2004), 421-
442.
20
M. Moody, ‘Serial Reciprocity; A Preliminary Statement’, Sociological Theory 26:2 (2008), 130-
151.
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but also altered as a result of the processes used in the redeployment of blood
into both the marketplace and the blood supply.22
Problems arise, then, when the donated blood is alienated from the giver
by default as a result of the unidentified reuse of the gift. Therefore, as blood
has becomemore potent as a commodity than a functioning body part following
its gifting, it has developed a form of ‘sociability’23 with subsequent bio-value
so that blood has become a form of new bio-capital.
Donations vs. Giving: The ethical use of donated blood
Referring to the work ofWeiner, blood is described as becoming inalienable,
i.e. the donated blood remains in some way related to the donor in spirit after
the blood has left the body. This is in contrast to the altruistic paradigm where
the gift was of whole blood largely with the popular understanding that the
blood became gifted in the same whole state. Weiner argues all personal pos-
sessions invoke a connection with their owner, which symbolises the personal
experience and adds to their overall identity. Blood donation is an example of
this. As blood is increasingly seen as a body-part, its donation or giving can in-
form us about the donor and what the action of giving holds for them, and
about the relationship of blood to the late postmodern body.
The discourse of blood donors about what happens to their blood after
donation nowadays progresses this notion that donors now want to keep whilst
giving. It is the change to the understanding of the new life that blood has after
donation that is entering the donor consciousness which, this paper argues,
hasmade blood inalienable, creating further tensions and instability within the
unfettered altruistic paradigm.24
Mauss sets out the obligations and reciprocal requirements that are needed
in order for stable gift exchange mechanisms to occur. These entwined obliga-
tions, to offer, to give, to receive, to accept and to repay, are crucial to the premise
of the gift exchange cycle. This is pertinent to the blood donation system in the
UK, which is still regarded today in the same as it was at its inception, i.e. one
based on simple altruistic gifting.
In reviewing the current status quo in the newly commercialised blood
market, Coleman argues that the process of donation is not able to conform to
A.B. Weiner, Inalienable Possessions: The Paradox of Keeping While Giving (Berkeley: University
of California Press 1992).
22
A. Appadurai, The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press 1998).
23
K. Arrow, ‘Gifts and Exchange’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 1:4 (1972), 343-362.24
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the full theoretical application of altruism as laid out by Mauss, as the way in
which contemporary societies organise and distribute the gift of blood does not
cater for the visual confirmation that the gift has been received.
There has been a change in the way that donated blood is perceived as a
quasi-body part in the consumer world. Being duty bound to engage in donating
pieces of the body, either in life or after death, has created areas of change in
the giving relationship as to how commoditisation influences the understanding
of the communal identity of donated blood. This poses further ethical issues
requiring reconsideration of the role of understanding donated blood as a gift
rather than a more neutral commodity.
3. Ethics and the Corporeal Gift
The Nuffield Report and the Blood 2020 Strategy both look
towards increasing use and re-use of a wider range of body parts and organs,
which has created a growing percentage of the general population joining the
‘donor’ fraternity as a result of receiving donor body parts through the impact
of rapid technological advances.25 According to the Nuffield Report, paragraph
65, the State remains the ‘steward’ of public health in relation to the donation
of bodily materials including blood. The Report states that no changes are re-
quired in the voluntary system presently in place, in which case the gift falls
into the hands of this stewardship which may create tension in the future.
Gold offers some ethical commentary on both body and blood. He argues
that the body has authentic good conferred upon it by society and this ismanifest
in diverse ways as well as in intensely personal ways.26 It is a representation of
who we are, and for some the body is the expression of a higher order, such as
God. Therefore society values the body as a whole, but also increasingly in and
for its contingent parts. Whilst these parts are not autonomous, the body is
being broken down into both visible and microscopic parts such as DNA. Gold
further highlights that this inherent ‘goodness’ of the body can be used in aiding
human health. He cites blood as an example of being symbolically representative
of life as well as becoming valuable as a ‘health preserving product’ once it has
been broken into its therapeutic parts (Factor VIII, plasma, etc.) This is an im-
portant ethical development in the way societal and individual blood is regarded.
While blood parts do not carry the same value as does blood as a whole, it is
Nuffield Report (2014), http://nuffieldbioethics.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Public-health-
ethical-issues.pdf (last accessed 23/9/2015).
25
E.R. Gold, Body Parts: Property Rights and the Ownership of Human Biological Materials26
(Washington DC: Georgetown University Press), 12.
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argued by Gold that we do value blood parts for what they represent in being a
‘symbol of community’, and thereby strengthening the growing link between
body components and health.
Gold postulates that, rather than blood as a symbol of life losing its power
via its transformation from whole blood to blood parts, in the doing of this the
value society places on blood must increase, as blood therefore confers life to
the recipient on behalf of society and not the donor. Ethical issues surround
the concepts concerning whose blood it is in the first place and who this mani-
fold body part belongs to. The property discourse was embedded in the solid
body part donation debate, but it is argued here that the transformation of
donated blood increases the original fluid’s value more than the volunteer
donors understand. The debate concerning ethics of blood parts is not evident
in theUK, perhaps because of the voluntary nature of the bloodmarket.Weiss’s
concept of ‘intercorporeality’ can be applied to the relationships created by the
donating and distribution of the specialist components of blood.27 Weiss is
correct when she argues that no one is discrete in their identity, as the new
person or ‘I’ is becomingmediated by the interdependence of what Waldby has
called ‘biotechnical fragmentation’.28 TheNHSBT should thereforemakemore
widely knownwhat happens to the whole blood that is collected, and to ascertain
whether donors know what happened to their blood after its donation, to allow
for informed consent concerning the gift of blood as one entity and recipients
being gifted or charged for a refashioned product of the gift.
Cohen also argues that there has been a development of an ‘ethics of parts’
in relation to the new divisible, commoditised late modern body.29 By this he
means that ethics and ethical stances that used to apply to whole bodies are
now applied part by part, thus allowing market forces to dictate the value of
individual parts. These ethics are now being applied to blood parts within the
Nuffield Report.
Lock argues that market forcesmake blood donating particularly vulnerable
to exploitation due to the fact that donors are made to feel that blood is both a
renewable resource from the body and easy to donate.30 This allows both objec-
tification and fetishism for those whose blood is rare, for example. Busby argues
G. Weiss, Body Images Embodiment as Intercorporeality (London: Routledge 1999).27
C. Waldby, ‘Stem Cells, Tissue Cultures and the Production of Biovalue Health’, An Interdis-
ciplinary Journal for the Social Study of Health, Illness and Medicine 6:3 (2003), 239.
28
L. Cohen, ‘Where it Hurts: Indian Material for an Ethics of Organ Transplantation’, Daedalus
128:4 (1999), 135-65, cited in: Scheper-Hughes &Waquant,Commodifying Bodies (London: Sage
2006), 1.
29
M. Lock, ‘The Alienation of Body Tissue and the Biopolitics of Immortalised CellLines’, Body
& Society 7:2-3 (2001), 63-91.
30
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that traditional blood services are built on the understanding that everyone is
dependent on transfusion and/or transplant medicine.31
Waldby and Mitchell postulate that tissue economies, which increasingly
include emergent blood-related economies, are about the tense intersection of
biological capacities and political systems of power.32 This in itself resonates
with the need to rethink the ethical issues with regard to the collection of blood
in an altruistic fashion and then alienating the donor from its subsequent re-
use. The donated blood, when circulating outside the body, becomes in fact
more important, it treats deficient bodies which are in need of its hidden powers.
Blood is separated out in order to produce more power parts in the form of
fractions of itself, e.g. Factor VIII or white cells. Some of the current donors
may understand the developing capacity of their donated blood, understanding
that the donation would be separated into parts and used for people with differ-
ent problems. Although donors may understand blood donation being seen
packaged into a new form, however other donors may not know fractionation
occurred, for whom there are potential future ethical issues.
4. Commoditisation of the gift
Sahlins stated, prophetically, that ‘one man’s gift should not
be another man’s capital.’33 This can be applied to current controversies over
blood donation, the argument being particularly pertinent to the themes iden-
tified in this paper, as in relation to blood this is precisely what has occurred.
Donors have had very little idea what value others put on their gift, and more
importantly, if the end product of the gift was not something that would be re-
cognisable to the majority of donors, then it cannot be the gift as given. Farrell
has asked whether blood now is really a gift or a commodity.34 The innocuous
donation of blood has turned into an unrecognisable product, and the convention
of a voluntary supply of blood does not mean that there is no selling of blood
here in the UK, as identified within the Archer Report.35
H. Busby, ‘The Meanings of Consent to the Donation of Cord Blood Stem Cells: Perspectives
from an Interview Based Study of a Public Cord Blood Bank in England’,Clinical Ethics 5 (2010),
22:27.
31
C.Waldby & R.Mitchell, Tissue Economy: Blood Organs and Cell Lines in Late Capitalism (London:
Duke University Press 2007).
32
M. Sahlins, Stone Age Economic (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1972) 14, Intro.33
A.M. Farrell, Political Scandal and Contaminated Blood in Ireland in Scandals in Past and Con-
temporary Politics (J. Garrard & J. Newell (eds.), Manchester: Manchester University Press
2005), 163-176.
34
The Archer Inquiry, Independent Public Inquiry Report on NHS Supplied contaminated blood and
blood products (2009).
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In looking at ways in which contemporary societies manage blood it is pos-
sible to say that donated blood has become ‘McDonaldised’.36Blood is processed
and packed in an identical way across the globe, with principles ofMcDonaldisa-
tion applied to the blood service in that the work is related to targets and strict
policy.37 The final aspect of the McDonaldisation thesis is that of control being
passed from human to non-human. The laboratory-based component services
are in the process of becoming non-human operated. The BPL is the embodi-
ment of this aspect. All these processes alienate the giver from their gift, so that
the need for re-evaluation of the concept of the gift of blood needs to be acknow-
ledged. How can the donated blood remain in any way related to the giver after
these processes?
5. Discussion
Some blood donorsmay understand this prerequisite relation-
ship between the State and their gift, but not all donors. The body part generation
seem to understand that blood is a substance for donating without emotions
attached to it, but we still need to reframe the actions from being altruistic or
those of citizenship to a half-way house of a covenant relationship. Ethically,
there is an issue over the use of donated blood in relation to the spirit of the
rationale for giving, thus echoing Titmuss, who predicted that the alienation
of the giver from the destination of the product would be problematic in relation
to blood donation. This leads contemporary blood donation to become defined
as a form of covenanted altruism.
If the NHSBT were to become a non-voluntary institution, there would be
serious ramifications for the ways in which the small part of the population
who give their blood for free would regard the product of their gift. We can relate
this issue to the work of Howson who argues that a key characteristic of the
contemporary society is not only the emphasis placed on consumption, but also
the sense of ‘self’ which derives from, for example, gifting of donated blood.
Therefore damaging the gift relationship could have profound implications for
people’s sense of self from their lack of knowledge of the true current market
value of their donated blood.38 This argument has relevance for how donors see
themselves in relation to the highly commoditised blood donation system. Beck
G. Ritzer,McDonaldisation: The Reader (London: Pine Forge Press 2006).36
Joint United Kingdom (UK) Blood Transfusion and Tissue Transplantation Services Profes-
sional Advisory Committee, www.transfusionguidelines.org.uk/red-book/(last accessed
12/10/2015).
37
A. Howson, The Body in Society (Cambridge: Polity Press 2004).38
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further argues that we have become ‘agents of the self’, creating a partnership
between the new technologies and the self.39
Further, the cultural value of differing parts of the body for sale or ‘donation’
informs us of the hierarchical regard for relevant parts of the body that different
cultures hold, which is well documented.40 It invites investigation concerning
the relationship between the body and the self in relation to the cyborg culture
as well as the concept of bio-value or body capital in the consumerist society.
6. Conclusion
This paper extends the scope of understanding changes in
blood donation and the gift relationship on which it depends, in relation to
ethics and the gift exchangemodel. It aims at addressing the impact of develop-
ments in biomedicine and consumerism with regard to the self and blood
donation and blood products, reflecting on the ethical issues involved in this
new type of giving and receiving. Hidden behind a mask of quasi-altruism,
donors are shown to be purposeful in their donation behaviour, and as Mauss
has argued, there is no such thing as a ‘free gift’. Thus this paper reveals a di-
chotomy in the interpretation of the action of blood donation – is it an unfettered
gift or a covenanted donation? An ethical rethink is required in order to fully
understand the new gift relationships that exist in the contemporary world of
blood donation.
U. Beck, The Risk Society: Towards A New Modernity (London: Sage 1992).39
B. Turner,Medical Power and Social Knowledge (2nd edn, London: Sage 2001).40
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Abstract
Living-donor kidney transplantation makes up a large proportion
of kidney transplantation in the UK. Kidney donation by prisoners is lawful, and the
British Transplantation Society recently compiled guidelines to help indicate the
situations in which it is currently considered acceptable and manageable for prisoners
to donate. Three main perspectives, that of the transplant recipients, the donating
prisoner and the victims of the prisoner’s crime, are of particular value and are dis-
cussed in this article considering the acceptability of prisoners becoming kidney donors.
Ultimately understanding the perspectives of these cohorts would benefit from further
research as much of the discussion of literature and views in this article are speculative.
This work should be carried out in a timely fashion so that, should the practice of
living kidney donation by prisoners be acceptable to these cohorts and the wider public,
the British Transplantation Society guidelines can be implemented and a sustainable
practice established.
Background
In the UK, 243 people died waiting for a kidney transplant in
2014-15.1 In the same year, living-donor kidney transplantation made up 34%
of kidney transplants in the UK.2 The shortage of deceased-donor organs for
transplantation means living kidney donation is now amajor part of transplan-
DOI 10.7590/221354015X14488767262958*
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tation practice.3 The increasing practice and awareness of living donation has
been accompanied by requests from prisoners to be considered as kidney
donors.4
As with the general population, there may be a number of physical and
mental health reasons that could exclude a prisoner from becoming a donor.
However, this exclusion may be over-represented in the prison population due
to the health inequalities experienced by offenders.5 Beyond these basic health-
related exclusion criteria, the British Transplantation Society recently compiled
some draft guidelines to assist healthcare practitioners and the Ministry of
Justice in dealing with requests from prisoners to become living donors.6 The
current guidelines are represented in Figure 1. This article aims to consider the
potential responses of transplant recipients, prisoners, victims of crime and
the wider society to these guidelines, considering:
1. The limitation of prisoners’ autonomy, and the appropriateness of permit-
ting or denying donation.
2. The perspective of crime victims on punishment and potential objections
about prisoners being allowed the option of donating.
3. The importance of directed and non-directed recipients’ access to trans-
plants, and reservations they may have about prisoners donating.
 
Figure 1:Current British Transplantation Society recommendations for prisoner
living kidney donation in theUK.Unrelated directed donation is not recommen-
ded. Directed donation to a genetically or emotionally related recipient is possible
for prisoners of any security category if the recipient is at high risk without the
transplant or no other donor is available. Non-directed altruistic donation is
Houses of Parliament, ‘Organ donation and Transplants’, POSTNote, Number 441 (September
2013).
3
British Transplantation Society, UK Guidelines for Living Organ Donation from Prisoners, Con-
sultation Version 2014-01-14, www.bts.org.uk/Documents/UK%20Guidelines%20for%20
4
Living%20Organ%20Donation%20from%20Prisoners%20Consultation%20version%20
January%202014.PDF (last accessed 26/9/2015).
Public Health England, Offender health (2015), www.nepho.org.uk/topics/Offender%20health
(last accessed 26/9/2015).
5
British Transplantation Society, op. cit.6
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possible for only low security prisoners if the donation cannot be delayed until
after release from prison.
Figure adapted from O’Brien et al. (2012)
B. O’Brien & M. Koertzen, ‘Anaesthesia for living donor renal transplant
nephrectomy’, Continuing Education in Anaesthesia, Critical Care & Pain 12:6
(2012), 317-321.
The Law Regarding Living Donor Transplantation
Transplantation is regulated by the Human Tissue Authority,
through their enforcement of the Human Tissue Act 2004.7 The Act requires
informed and uncoerced consent from the living donor. The Mental Capacity
Act8 and common law stipulate the conditions that identify an individual as
mentally competent to give consent.9 Additionally, the act of donation must be
altruistic; no tissue can lawfully be procured and transplanted if the donation
will result in any kind of reward for the donor.10 As long as these statutory and
common law requirements are met, prisoners are not categorically excluded
from living kidney donation. However, historically, donation by prisoners has
been restricted.11
As living kidney donation by prisoners is not prohibited by law, restrictions
in place are due to a combination of moral and practical issues. Practical diffi-
culties include:
– Logistical complications in ensuring safe and securemanagement of donors
– i.e. not allowing escape of the prisoner during hospital visits and stays,
or any other potential compromise of public and staff security.
– Ensuring donor screening to rule out transmissible disease is valid at the
time of surgery, given the high transmission rates of blood-borne diseases
in prisons.12
– Ensuring valid, uncoerced consent can be obtained from the prisoner.
Human Tissue Act 2004, part 2, section 33.7
Mental Capacity Act 2005, part 1.8
Human Tissue Authority,Code of Practice 2. Donation of Solid Organs for Transplantation (March
2013).
9
Human Tissue Act, op. cit., part 2, section 33.10
British Transplantation Society, op. cit.11
Department of Health, Tackling Blood-Borne Viruses in Prisons. A framework for best practice in
the UK (May 2011), www.nat.org.uk/media/Files/Publications/May-2011-Tackling-Blood-Borne-
Viruses-in-Prisons.pdf (last accessed 26/9/2015).
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There are concerns that meeting these requirements in order to allow the
few cases of prisoner donation would require allocation of resources, potentially
above and beyond that already provided. This could raise moral reservations
about directing such valuable resources towards prisoners and for gains that
may be outweighed by the public risk (and therefore not in the public interest).13
Prisoners
Amajor concern regarding prisoner living donation is uncer-
tainty about prisoners’ ability to give unpressured, uncoerced consent.14 The
concern arises particularly from the need to avoid exploitation of vulnerable
prisoners. Because imprisonment takes away autonomy and causes great psy-
chological strain, it may be thought that imprisonment itself limits a persons
ability to give valid consent. Prisoners have a high level of dependence on the
institution as they are forced to relinquish their autonomy15 and most of their
actions are watched over by prison staff. Prisons also create a large, closed
community with their own hierarchy which may make the monitoring and
avoidance of coercion difficult to guarantee. However, in the context of psycho-
logical treatment of prisoners that benefits others (reduces future offending),
which requires consent from the prisoner, it has been found that the treatment
does not have to be coercive, even in the context of court-mandated treatment
within the prison setting.16 Hence, donating a kidney or otherwise becoming a
living donor can be beneficial to others (and is outside the remit of the courts),
and can be considered as unlikely to be directly coerced by the donor being
imprisoned.
A further concern is to prevent donation by those with inappropriatemotives
or unrealistic expectations of the outcomes of donating. The (incorrect) expec-
tation of reward for donationmay serve as an inappropriate and possibly coercive
motivation for donation. It is illegal for any reward for donation to bemonetary,17
however most would see it as a selfless, ‘good’ act. The prisoner may therefore
expect organ donation to act as ‘good behaviour’ and potentially be counted to-
wards shortening their prison sentence. This, of course, cannot be the case,
British Transplantation Society, op. cit.13
A. Caplan, ‘The Use of Prisoners as Sources of Organs-An Ethically Dubious Practice’, The
American Journal of Bioethics 11:10 (2011), 1-5.
14
C.Haney, ‘The Psychological Impact of Incarceration: Implications for Post-Prison Adjustment’,
Working papers prepared for the ‘From Prison to Home’ Conference (30-31 January 2002).
15
J. Rigg, ‘Measures of perceived coercion in prison treatment settings’, International Journal of
Law and Psychiatry 25:5 (2002), 473-90.
16
Human Tissue Act, op. cit., part 2, section 33.17
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and both this situation and concerns about coercion can be addressed by
ensuring adequate explanation to any potential donors of what they can and
cannot expect as a result of donation.
Yet another inappropriate expectationmay be that the donation has a positive
effect on the relationship between the donor and recipient in circumstances
where the two are related. Imprisonment puts considerable strain on relation-
ships with friends and family, and the prisoner may hope that donating their
kidney would help to compensate or alleviate this strain. However, such a pos-
itive outcome from kidney donation cannot reliably be predicted, as it has been
found that directed donationmay have no effect or even in some cases a negative
effect on relationships.18 The compulsory independent assessment process re-
quired for all living donors assesses each donor on an individual basis, thereby
identifying these potential unrealistic expectations. However, when the donor
is a prisoner, the assessor needs to be mindful of the extra stresses and strains
the individual and their family are under, providing them with the necessary
information to ensure their decision is based upon informed consent.
When considering the extra resources that may be implicated in utilising
prisoners as donors, a counterargument to supporting prisoners as donors is
that it may be more appropriate to suggest waiting until the prisoner has been
released. Based on a Freedom of Information request in 2013,19 42 prisoners at
the time were serving life sentences in prison, meaning the vast majority of
prisoners will serve their sentence then be released, making donation after re-
lease an option. However, after their release from prison, integrating back into
society and rebuilding their life may be difficult enough without the added
burden of undergoing complex medical assessments and procedures. In addi-
tion, it has been found that incarceration strongly affects people’s health, pre-
dominantly caused by stigma associated with imprisonment, and that these
effects are most pronounced after release. The timing of these negative health
effects is partly attributed to diminished wage growth and marital instability.20
It may therefore be more appropriate for people in prison to donate whilst still
in the relatively stable environment of their prison stay. Countering this, it may
also be argued that if they are not prepared to commit to the level of effort re-
quired to become a donor after their release, then perhaps they are not highly
motivated enough to donate in the first place.
G. Heck, J. Schweitzer & M. Seidel-Wiesel, ‘Psychological effects of living related kidney
transplantation – risks and chances’, Clinical Transplantation 18:6 (2004), 716-21.
18
Ministry of Justice Freedom of Information Request, Reference 82302 (May 2013).19
J. Schnittker & A. John, ‘Enduring stigma: the long-term effects of incarceration on health’,
Journal of Health and Social Behavior 48:2 (2007), 115-30.
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While much of the discussion around prisoners as organ donors in this ar-
ticle has so far been based on theoretical risk, history has unfortunately shown
numerous situations in which prisoners have been exploited in the context of
organ donation. For example, in China, there has been long-term reliance on
the use of organs for transplantation without consent from executed prisoners,
although they are said to have since worked towards an ethical and sustainable
organ donation system.21 In the USA, there has been a case of ‘kidney for pa-
role’.22 In the Philippines, a ‘kidney for parole’ scheme was considered (it was
not implemented because it was considered coercive and unethical).23However,
it is worth reiterating that it has not been suggested that any type of scheme in
which parole is offered in return for donation should be implemented in the
UK, despite instances of such proposals elsewhere.
Overprotection (with the aim of protecting those vulnerable to coercion or
who are motivated by unrealistic expectations of reward) through unnecessary
and paternalistic prevention of all prisoners from donating can be as damaging
as underprotection.24Where it is possible to know that a person ismaking their
own decision to become a living donor, it is logical to support them to accom-
plish this decision. The British Transplantation Society guidance should assist
this process.
After thorough screening, the prisoner donor will be granted or denied the
opportunity to donate. We have so far considered the potential harm to the
prisoner if permission is granted, but refusal of donation also has the potential
to be harmful. However, there is a lack of information on the potential negative
effects of refusing donation25 and it has been suggested that thorough explana-
tion is needed in the case of refused donation, in order to helpmanage reactions
of disappointment and distress.26 Guidance supporting the donation of organs
from prisoners should also cover this.
World Health Organization, ‘New era for organ donation and transplant in China’, Bulletin of
the World Health Organization 90:11 (2012), 793-868 [online].
21
A.M. Goldberg & J. Frader, ‘Prisoners as Living Organ Donors: The Case of the Scott Sisters’,
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Transplant recipients
There are two groups of recipients to consider in the context
of prisoner living donation:
– Recipients of a directed donation from an imprisoned friend or family
member.
– Recipients of non-directed altruistic donation.
Directed Donation
As represented in Figure 1, the recently preparedUKGuidelines
for Living Organ Donation from Prisoners do not recommend directed donation
from a prisoner to any individual with whom they have no prior emotional or
genetic relationship, because of the ‘potential risk of inappropriate and/or
complex attachment issues arising from the donation’.27 Avoidance of this
consequence is a clearly stated reason not to allow prisoners to donate directly
to a named stranger. To those drafting the guidelines, the risks outweighed the
potential benefit in this situation.
The guidance also places restrictions on living kidney donation by a prisoner
to a named individual they are already emotionally or genetically related to (re-
lated directed donation). The guidance recommends related directed donation
can be considered for any prisoner if the circumstances are exceptional,
meaning specifically if the recipient has no other possible donor or is at unac-
ceptably high risk of ‘severe morbidity or mortality’ without the transplant.28
This implies that a related directed kidney donation from a prisoner is con-
sidered a last resort and has the potential to delay the donation.
In general, living-donor kidney transplantation has the advantage of a
shorter waiting time between starting dialysis and receiving the transplant, and
can even allow pre-emptive transplantation – before the recipient’s kidney
function deteriorates to the stage where dialysis is required.29 These factors can
improve the likelihood of transplant success.30 Where the donor is a prisoner
and the donation is delayed due to the need not being medically urgent – as
per the current recommendations – this could negatively impact the recipient’s
British Transplantation Society, op. cit.27
Ibid.28
The British Transplantation Society and The Renal Association, United Kingdom Guidelines for
Living Donor Kidney Transplantation (3rd edn, May 2011), www.bts.org.uk/Documents/
29
Guidelines/Active/UK%20Guidelines%20for%20Living%20Donor%20Kidney%20
July%202011.pdf (last accessed 27/9/2015).
S.W. Yoo, O.J. Kwon & C.M. Kang, ‘Preemptive Living-Donor Renal Transplantation: Outcome
and Clinical Advantages’, Transplantation Proceedings 41 (2009), 117-120.
30
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quality of life andmay even reduce their chance of a successful transplant. This
can be construed as punishing the potential recipient for the past unlawful be-
haviour of their potential donor.
The situation could also arise where the recipient has two possible matches;
a ‘perfect’ match in an imprisoned donor and a ‘less than perfect’ match in a
donor who is not imprisoned. Should the donor have to wait for the perfect
match? Should they have to accept the less than perfect match because of time
and cost savings? Any situation where the best medical option might be influ-
enced by the incarceration status of the donor seems untenable, yet one can
envision the difficulty of the decision-making process in this situation.
From a societal perspective, the restriction on the situations in which a
prisoner can become a directed donor has the potential to contribute to unequal
access to living-donor kidney transplants already experienced by people from
socially deprived backgrounds.31 As well as being less likely to receive living-
donor kidney transplants, people from socially deprived communities aremore
likely to have family or close friends in prison.32 Therefore, although the guid-
lines to include prisoners as donors act generally to support organ donation
from prisoners, these restrictions on related donation may be contributing to
inequality. To promote social equality in organ donation (and potentially increase
the number of donations) the guidance should allow related directed donation
by a prisoner to be considered with an equal level of importance to if they were
not in prison.
Non-Directed Altruistic Donation
If prisoners were to be able to be non-directed kidney donors,
the point of view of those who may become recipients of such anonymous
donations needs to be considered. There is a certain amount of stigma associated
with imprisonment and potential recipients may feel that they do not want to
be associated with a prisoner, even if it meant having to wait longer for a
donation (or perhaps never receiving a transplant). However, it is also possible
that potential non-directed recipients of prisoner kidney donation may value
the importance of their access to organs for transplantation more highly than
whether the donor is a prisoner or not.
U. Udayaraj, Y. Ben-Shlomo, P. Roderick, A. Casula, C. Dudley, D. Collett, D. Ansell,31
C. Tomson & F. Caskey, ‘Social deprivation, ethnicity, and uptake of living kidney donor
transplantation in the United Kingdom’, Transplantation 93:6 (2012), 610-16.
F.C. Bruce, ‘Reinvesting in Communities: Community Justice as a Viable Solution to Mass
Incarceration’, Internet Journal of Criminology (November 2012).
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There is some evidence to suggest that the opportunity of receiving a
transplant would be valued more highly than the background of the donor. In
the USA, 13 out of 16 patients on an active waiting list for lung transplants re-
sponded that they would accept organs from a death-row inmate.33 The same
survey showed patients waiting for transplants, or who have already benefited
from transplant, felt that if even just one person was helped, then donation by
a prisoner on death-row would be acceptable.34 Beyond this, there is a lack of
evidence on specific attitudes towards prisoners as living kidney donors, and
carrying out this research in the form of opinion polls, questionnaires or inter-
views would be a valuable source of information on the views of the general
public and, specifically, potential recipients.
Current practice relating to altruistic non-directed kidney donors ensures
the recipient is not aware of who their donor is.35 Therefore, the recipient would
not be aware that their donor was a prisoner and this should eliminate any de-
cision-making (and associated stress) to do with accepting an organ donated by
a prisoner. However, the uncertainty of not knowing one way or the other could
be an issue for some recipients.
It is also known that there is a higher rate of blood-borne virus transmission
in prisons than in the general population,36 and therefore an increased risk of
blood-borne virus transmission upon transplant due to new infection between
donor screening and surgery. Either the screening system would need to be
suitably adjusted to be certain the increased risk was ruled out, or recipients
would need to bemade aware of the increased risk during the operation consent
process. In the latter case, this would mean that even though the origin of the
organ had not been explicitly divulged, the recipient might infer that the donor
was a prisoner. This would then re-open the issues mentioned above and could
put an unnecessary burden on the recipient by having to accept or reject the
organ if they had moral or other personal beliefs that would question their
willingness to accept an organ from a prisoner.
While the choice between good health and personal concern about the origins
of an organ might seem easy to some, it is worth considering that if the trans-
plant is successful, the organ will remain in the recipient’s body for the rest of
their life. A common perception of the imprisoned criminal is of someone of
S.S. Lin, L. Rich, J.D. Pal & R.M. Sade, ‘Prisoners on death row should be accepted as organ
donors’, The Annals of Thoracic Surgery 93:6 (2012), 1773-79.
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low social status who is cruel in nature and disliked by the public.37 Therefore
it is a reasonable speculation that the idea of receiving an organ from such a
person could be troublesome for the recipient and lead to complex and long
term internal emotional conflict should they accept the organ donation.
Looking into this, the way a recipient would feel about having a prisoner as
a kidney donor may depend on the crime committed. It could be speculated
that (if information on a donor’s criminal record was available to them) a recip-
ient may be more reluctant about receiving a kidney from someone convicted
of one type of crime over another. To address this gradation of type of crime
without revealing the exact nature of the donor’s crime it may be argued that
prisoner living kidney donation should not be permitted beyond low risk pris-
oners. The reality however, is that prisoners are categorised based on current
likelihood of escape and danger to the public, not by the crime committed. This
means low risk category prisoners can include, for example, those serving life
sentences for murder.38
A counterargument to this concern is that people who have been in prison
in the past, or committed crimes and not been convicted or imprisoned, are
currently free to become non-directed kidney donors if willing and medically
able. In reality, considering that these individuals are not excluded from becom-
ing living donors, the recipient accepting a non-directed altruistic living kidney
donation has the chance of receiving a kidney from someonewho has committed
a serious offence even if prisoners were not included as living donors at all.
Crime victims
Living organ donation involving a prisoner introduces a third
party not present when the donor is not a prisoner. This third party is the pris-
oner’s victim(s). There could be several possible reasons for those affected by
‘victimful’ crimes39 to be against permitting prisoners to become living kidney
donors. These include:
C. Côté-Lussier, ‘The evil, poor, disliked and punished: criminal stereotypes and the effects of
their cognitive, affective and behavioural outcomes on punitiveness toward crime’, PhD thesis
(The London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), 2012).
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adult-males.doc (last accessed 1/12/2015).
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relates of Victimful Criminal Behaviour’, Personality and Individual Differences 9:3 (1998), 525-
48.
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– Not wanting the person who victimised them to be able to feel they have
redeemed themselves.
– Not wanting the person who victimised them to be able to help another
(often their own friend or relative).
– Not wanting the prisoner to be able to exercise autonomous control over
their own body.
– Not wanting to allow the prisoner to achieve improved self-worth as a result
of donation.
A prisoner’s lack of freedom is accompanied by an inevitable loss of oppor-
tunity to make autonomous choices. The liberty of choice prisoners may have
over becoming a living donor may be perceived as affecting the completeness
of their punishment. It could be argued that as a part of punishment, prisoners’
autonomy should be restricted to exclude this type of decision. This could work
in two ways, one being to remove their choice to donate andmake it compulsory
to ‘donate’ a kidney once imprisoned. The implications and moral arguments
for and against this go beyond the scope of this essay. The alternative would be
to deny the prisoner the choice of becoming a voluntary donor.
Victims may be motivated by revenge, to deny prisoners the choice of
donating a kidney because of the possibility that this will cause prisoners dis-
tress, or at least prevent them from experiencing a positive outcome. However,
there is evidence suggesting revenge is not a highly important punishment
outcome for victims. In one study, revenge as an outcome of punishment was












Table 1: In a study by U. Orth in 2003, 171 victims of violent crime were
asked to rate the importance of 18 statements relating to punishment goals with
U. Orth, ‘Punishment Goals of Crime Victims’, Law and Human Behavior 27:2 (2003).40
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regards to the criminal case they were involved in. ‘M’ is the rating from 0
– ‘not at all important’ to 5 – ‘very important’.
Table adapted from U. Orth, ‘Punishment Goals of Crime Victims’, Law
and Human Behavior 27:2 (2003).
A limitation of the study was questionable representativeness of the results.
The response rate to the victim survey which was used to collect information
was low, and the demographics of respondents was not explored to determine
if there was a difference between those who did and those who did not respond.41
Individuals’ responses to being victimised are highly variable, and clearly those
responding to the study survived the offences against them. The opinion of
someone whose family-member, friend or associate has been murdered for
example, could be dramatically different. In the case of a Belgian prisoner who
wanted to be euthanised,42 the sisters of one of his victims were reported as
saying he should ‘languish in prison’ rather than being given what he wanted,
and they pointed out that though a huge amount of consideration was put into
whether his wishes would be carried out, no experts asked either their opinion
or if they needed help dealing with the situation.43
Limitations aside, the cohort who responded to the survey in Orth’s paper
placed offender deterrence and security of the victim and society as the most
important aims of punishment. Revenge was the second-lowest rated of the
punishment goal categories. As the safety of others in society was an important
concern, this could be tentatively extrapolated to suggest victims would be
considerate of the needs of potential transplant recipients. However, a wide
range of crime victims would need to be asked to find a more representative
viewpoint.
At the same time, victim and societal safety could be seen as a counterargu-
ment to allowing prisoners to be living kidney donors. The British Transplanta-
tion Society guidelines recommend that prisoner donation can be permitted
from even high risk prisoners (in certain circumstances)44 where it can be
demonstrated that the process can be appropriately managed, maintaining
public and employee safety. As prisoners’ risk categories are based on their risk
Ibid.41
R. Spencer, ‘Belgian rapist and murderer to be put to death by lethal injection’, The Telegraph
(4 January 2015), www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/belgium/11324579/Belgian-
rapist-and-murderer-to-be-put-to-death-by-lethal-injection.html (last accessed 3/10/2015).
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of escaping incarceration, harming others or themselves45 this guidance seems
to actively seek putting victims and society at risk – contrary to the victims’
values of punishment.
Restorative justice is a process in which people affected by a specific offence
work together to deal with its aftermath, and aims to ensure the victim feels
‘paid back’ for the harm done to them, give the perpetrator the opportunity for
redemption, and increase public confidence in the criminal justice system.46
This was not covered in Orth’s paper, but has been reported in the media to be
beneficial formany victims of crime.47Money recovered from offenders is being
used to deliver restorative justice in the UK, in order to help find ways to posi-
tively move forward from crimes.48 Victim participation in restorative justice
suggests people wish to help a positive situation arise from a negative one.49
This not only indicates that there are victims who want a better outcome for
themselves and the offender, but it demonstrates a preference to prevent con-
tinuing misfortune. Therefore, victims who support restorative justice would
likely be in favour of allowing prisoners to become living kidney donors.
Conclusion
It is possible that, if carefully managed, allowing living dona-
tion by prisoners who aremotivated and able to do so could increase the potential
population of living donors by a small number. However, this is a controversial
consideration and there are a lot of perspectives which could challenge the idea
of allowing of prisoners to become donors. It would be beneficial to research
people’s current perspectives on prisoner living donation, including the points
of view of transplant recipients, people who have been victims of crime, and
prisoners themselves, in order to get a clearer idea of whether those directly
affected and members of society in general are accepting of the concept of
Offenders’ Families Helpline, Prisoner Category, www.offendersfamilieshelpline.org/index.45
php/prisoner-category/ (last accessed 27/9/2015).
The Crown Prosecution Service, Restorative Justice. Legal Guidance, www.cps.gov.uk/legal/46
p_to_r/restorative_justice/ (last accessed 13/10/2015).
J. Lopez, ‘Crime victims find healing through restorative justice’, KALW Local Public Radio
91.7FM in San Francisco 7 October 2013), http://kalw.org/post/crime-victims-find-healing-
through-restorative-justice#stream/0 (last accessed 27/9/2015).
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prisoners donating. However, collecting information about people’s opinions
on the subject presents another possible issue. Drawing public attention to the
subject of prisoner donation could possibly lead to ‘backlash’ and negative
publicity. However, prisoner donation has historically been restricted, so it is
unknown what people’s responses will be to the concept of officially including
prisoners as living donors until the topic is explored further, regardless of the
potential and perhaps unsubstantiated reactions. This work should be carried
out as soon as possible to aid discussion and decision-making when consulting
the currently available guidelines.
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